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Not Endowed by Their Creator: State Mandated Expenses
of Louisiana Parish Governing Bodies
I. Jackson Burson, Jr.*
". a police jury is a creature of the
state and possesses only those powers
conferred by the state's constitution and
statutes."
Reed v. Washington Parish
Police Jury, 518 So. 2d 1044, 1046
(La. 1988)
I. INTRODUCTION
The economic depression of the late 1980's in Louisiana exacerbated
structural weaknesses in Louisiana government and finance at all levels.
Burgeoning deficits led the state government to cut drastically its ap-
propriation to the parish road and bridge fund, which was formerly the
main source of funding relied upon by most parishes for construction,
repair, and maintenance of their roads and bridges.' As money from
Baton Rouge diminished, the parishes saw federal revenue sharing funds
cut off simultaneously. Beginning with the Nixon presidency, many
parishes unfortunately budgeted these non-recurring federal funds for
Copyright 1990, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
First Assistant District Attorney, 27th Judicial District Court, Eunice, Louisiana.
1. 1974 La. Acts No. 336 created the Parish Transportation Fund, which is codified
at La. R.S. 48:751-755 (1984 and Supp. 1990). La. R.S. 48:753(A)(1) (Supp. 1990) provides
that the state appropriations are to be used for work and equipment which "further ...
the parish road system." These funds are statutorily dedicated revenue that cannot be
used for payment of any mandated expenses discussed in this article. Between 1984 and
1989, funds appropriated to the Parish Transportation Fund dropped precipitously, as the
following chart indicates:
1984-85 $144,940,145.00
1985-86 $ 23,518,748.00
1986-87 $ 15,276,943.00
1987-88 $ 10,955,120.00
1988-89 $ 7,740,484.00
State Treasurer's Office and Police Jury Association of Louisiana. Following social science
methodology, many of the budget figures cited in this article were obtained directly from
the primary sources either at the parish or state level.
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the payment of recurring expenses of vital governmental services in-
cluding payment of many expenses mandated by state law, Which in-
creased dramatically at the same time as federal revenue sharing
disappeared.
Concurrent with the cessation of the federal and state largesse, which
had become an integral part of their budgets in the 1970's and early
1980's,2 most of Louisiana's parish governments3 experienced a decrease
in the valuation of real property assessed for ad valorem tax purposes.
Farm land that sold for $1,500.00 an acre in 1978 sold for $600.00 in
1988. Commercial property lost market value precipitously as businesses
went bankrupt. Homes, only eighty-five percent of which were subject
to ad valorem taxation statewide anyway, lost value with stunning swift-
ness.
The coalescence of all these negative events left many parish gov-
ernments on the verge of bankruptcy. Headlines revealed parish police
juries from such parishes as St. Landry and Tangipahoa 4 seriously dis-
cussing termination of vital services.' The entire road and bridge crew
of St. Landry Parish was dismissed in 1988 because there was no money
to pay them.,
As the parish police juries teetered on the brink of insolvency, many
of the parish officials entrusted with the performance of vital judicial,
2. 31 U.S.C. § 6708 (repealed 1986) provided for allocations from the federal treasury
to county governments based on criteria of population, amount of taxes paid in the
county area and the relative income of the county. This statute was first passed on October
20, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, §§ 108(A),(b)(l), 109(d),(F)(2), 86 Stat. 924, 929-30 (1972),
repealed by Act of April 17, 1986, Pub. L. 99-272, Title XIV, § 14001(a)(l), 100 Stat.
327 (1986) (effective on the earlier of the date of adjournment sine die of the 99th
Congress, or December 31, 1986). See attached Appendix "A" detailing St. Landry Parish
Appropriations of 1975-1990, showing the use of Federal Revenue Sharing funds to pay
soaring mandated costs, and reduction of police jury revenue as mandated expenses rose.
3. As noted below, there are 15 parishes governed under Home Rule Charter forms
of government-usually called Parish Councils-rather than by the statutorily created
police jury system. Their problems with mandated expenses are the same as the police
jurors' problems. To avoid confusion, the generic terms "parish governing authority,"
or "parish governing body" will be used to identify both forms of parish government
where their situations are identical.
4. Tangipahoa Parish Council official minutes (1988), October 5, 1988, page No.
504, wherein the Council voted to file bankruptcy. Governor Won't Let Parish Proceed
With Bankruptcy, Hammond Daily Star, Oct. 11, 1988 at 1; Council Votes to File
Bankruptcy, Hammond Daily Star, Oct. 6, 1988 ait 1 (Governor Roemer did not approve
the application but the lights were out for three days in the courthouse).
5. According to a July 1986 Survey by the Louisiana Police Jury Association, the
60 parishes responding reported losing 16.40 of their employees or a total of 1,351
workers, of whom 600o had been employed in road and bridge maintenance crews. St.
Landry and Tensas Parish reported no parish road maintenance employees at all.
6. Official Minutes (1987) of St. Landry Parish Police Jury Special Meeting held
on January 14, 1987, Resolution No. 1, at 2.
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executive, electoral, and administrative functions found their various
sources of revenue deleteriously affected by the general reduction of
state support services and the decline of local governmental revenues
caused by the general decline of commerce across the state. For instance,
as fewer state troopers patrolled Louisiana highways, fewer traffic tickets
were given and the criminal court cost funds declined markedly in most
parishes. This circumstance deprived district attorneys and the district
judges of money they relied upon for performing their functions. Once
again the parish police juries were adversely affected because they receive
fifty percent of the surplus in the criminal court fund at the end of
the fiscal year. 7
Supplemental pay to parish sheriff's deputies by the State of Louis-
iana was cut in the state budget at the same time that the rising tide
of narcotics-connected crime left most sheriffs understaffed. 8
Federal courts were limiting jail cell occupancy and requiring im-
provements to parish jails at the very time that the funds available to
pay for such improvements were diminishing.
Increases in crime required more expensive services from parish
district attorneys, coroners, sheriffs, clerks of court, and courts.
Not surprisingly, many parish officials who determine their budgets
independent of police jury control found it necessary to request increases
in the funds that state law mandates parish police juries to provide
parish officials at the very time that parish police juries sought to cut
back, or at least hold the line, on these.expenses. A clash was inevitable
and it has occurred.
The courts have thus far steadfastly maintained that parish police
juries are obligated to provide the funds mandated by state law to parish
officials, district attorneys, and judges. However, the Louisiana Supreme
Court, in upholding a district attorney's right to receive mandated costs
in the case of Reed v. Washington Parish Police Jury,9 has made it
plain that there is a limit. The police jury's duty to fund statutorily
mandated expenses "is limited by the standard of reasonableness."' 10 A
district attorney's budget request must meet twin criteria to enjoy the
status of legally mandated expenses: (1) his budget request "must be
legitimate in that it is related to the function of his office," and (2)
his budget request "must be qualitatively reasonable."" Presumably, the
same criteria apply to budget requests for mandated expenses made by
other parish officials.
7. La. R.S. 15:57.1.11 (1981).
8. La. R.S. 33:2218.8 (1988).
9. 518 So. 2d 1044 (La. 1988).
10. Id. at 1049.
11. Id.
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At the extreme, there lurks in many parishes the specter of another
less ephemeral limit than the well-worn standard of "reasonableness."
What will happen when there is no money in the bank to pay all of
a parish police jury's mandated expenses? Obviously, they will not be
paid if the parish checks will not be honored at the bank. Does the
limit of "impossibility of performance" now intrude into the govern-
mental debate as it might steal surreptitiously into a desperate law
student's answer in a freshman contracts class? One supposes it must.
Given the irrefutable fact that a police jury cannot pay all its
mandated expenses if it does not have enough money to pay them, one
must then necessarily confront another dilemma. If the police jury can
only pay a portion of its mandated expenses, which expenses have
preference? Is there a constitutional or statutory justification for de-
claring, e.g., that the district judges are primus inter pares among local
officials because they can hold police jurors in contempt for refusing
to pay their mandated expenses? Are district judges and district attorneys,
as functionaries of the state judicial system enshrined as a co-equal
branch with the state executive and legislative branches of government,
entitled to receipt of their necessary expenses in preference to other local
officials, many of whom are also enshrined in the state constitution?
Are some recipients of mandated expenses entitled to primacy over others
or should all mandated expenses be reduced pro rata to fit the constraints
of available funds?
One will search the current Louisiana Constitution, statutes, and
jurisprudence in vain for a specific answer to the questions posed above.
It is the purpose of this article:
(1) To delineate the extent of mandated expenses that the
parish police jury is obligated to pay under current Louisiana
law;
(2) To define the inherent dilemma created by state statutes
that mandate police juries on the one hand to pay all expenses
requested by another official beyond their control and on the
other hand to balance their budgets; and
(3) To suggest some possible approaches to resolving the
paradox inherent in placing increased expense burdens upon
police juries without providing the fiscal means to meet these
additional responsibilities.
II. THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION OF 1974: THmEE BASIC FORMS FOR
PARISH GOVERNMENT-NONE OF WHICH PROVIDED FINAL CONTROL
OVER THE PARISH BUDGET TO THE PARISH GOVERNING AUTHORITY
A. Forms of Parish Government
Article VI of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 authorizes three
basic types of parish government. First, a home rule charter form of
[Vol. 50
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parish government is based upon a charter that has been approved by
a majority of the parish electors voting in an election called for that
purpose. The home rule charter "[s]hall provide the structure and or-
ganization, powers, and functions of the [parish] government . . ., which
may include the exercise of any power and performance of any function
necessary, requisite, or proper for the management of its affairs, not
denied by general law or inconsistent with this constitution."'1 2 The
parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, East Baton Rouge, Lafayette, St. Mary,
Iberia, Lafourche, Plaquemines, St. Charles, St. James, St. John, Caddo,
Tangipahoa, Terrebonne, and St. Bernard all have home rule charters.
St. Tammany Parish approved a home rule charter, but then returned
to the police jury system.
Second, a parish government that has no home rule charter "may
exercise any power and perform any function necessary, requisite or
proper for the management of its affairs, not denied by its charter or
by general law, if a majority of the electors voting in an election held
for that purpose vote in favor of the proposition that the governing
authority may exercise such general powers."' 3 Citizens of the forty-
nine parishes that now have statutory forms of parish government, police
juries, could elect to grant them home rule powers. No parish electorate
has yet chosen this form of government.
Third, a parish government that has no home rule charter and in
which a majority of the electorate has failed to approve a grant of
general governmental powers has only "the powers authorized by this
constitution or by law.' 1 4 The forty-nine parish police juries fit into
this third category of statutorily created parish governments.
Section 14 of article VI of the Louisiana Constitution prohibits state
legislative increases in expenditures for "wages, hours, working condi-
tions, pension and retirement benefits, vacation or sick leave benefits"
for parish employees until such increases "are approved by ordinance
enacted by the governing authority" of the parish or "until the legislature
appropriates funds for that purpose to 'the parish' and only to the
extent and amount that such funds are provided."' 5 An exception is
made for "laws establishing civil service, minimum wages, working
conditions and retirement benefits" for firemen and policemen. Thus,
the constitution grants the legislature plenary power over wages and
employee benefits of local firemen and policemen.' 6
12. La. Const. art. VI, § 5(E).
13. Id. at § 7(A).
14. Id.
15. Id. at § 14.
16. Spillman v. City of Baton Rouge, 441 So. 2d 1243 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983),
writ denied, 446 So. 2d 1213 (1984).
1990]
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Actually the prohibition against legislative increases of parish em-
ployee expenses embodied in article VI, section 14 offers the parish
government bodies protection that is more apparent than real. Many
individuals who receive paychecks from parish funds are not direct
employees of the parish governing body per se. Instead, they are em-
ployees of state or parish officials whose offices are enshrined in the
constitution, or they are the constitutional officers themselves. Moreover,
section 14 of article VI limits legislative increases of parish expenditures
only in the areas of employee emoluments. Neither that section nor any
other constitutional provision forbids the legislature to do what it has
done time and time again-increase the emoluments due to a host of
recipients of funds from the parish treasury ranging from justices of
the peace to judges of the district courts.
Unfortunately, the Louisiana Constitution does not vest in any organ
of parish government the power to coordinate the requests for expen-
ditures made by the various parish officials so as to insure that the
funds requested do not exceed the funds available from the meager
revenue sources permitted the parishes by the constitution and state
statutes. A perpetual melee among competing parish official fiefdoms
for available funds has resulted.
B. Constitutional Provisions for Parish Government Finance
1. Ad Valorem Taxes
Section 26 of article VI empowers the governing authority of a
parish to "levy annually an ad valorem tax for general purpose not to
exceed four mills on the dollar of assessed valuation." In Orleans Parish,
the limit is seven mills and in Jackson Parish it is five mills. 1 7 Parish
electors can increase this general millage rate by vote."8 Ad valorem
taxes for specific purposes are also authorized. 19
If all homes in Louisiana were subject to ad valorem taxation, the
four mill constitutional ad valorem tax would supply a large predictable
and consistent basis for parish government financing. However, the
constitution establishes a $75,000.00 homestead exemption, 20 which ex-
empts at least eighty-five percent of Louisiana home owners from paying
any parish ad valorem taxes.
2. Sales Taxes
Sales and use taxes may be levied by vote of a majority of parish
voters up to a maximum of three percent. However, the three percent
17. La. Const. art. VI, § 26.
18. Id. at § 26(A).
19. Id.
20. La. Const. art. VII, § 20.
[Vol. 50
PARISH POLICE JURY EXPENSES
limitation includes all sales taxes levied by municipalities. Because mu-
nicipalities may levy a sales tax of up to two and a half percent upon
approval of the voters, 21 the availability of this source of revenue to
the parish is sharply limited.
3. Occupational License Taxes
The Louisiana Constitution authorized parishes to impose an oc-
cupational license tax "not greater than that imposed by the state.' '22
4. Prohibition Against Parish Levy of Severance Taxes, Income
Taxes, and Motor Fuel Taxes
Article VII, section 4(C) prohibits the enactment of a severance tax,
income tax, or tax on motor fuel by a political subdivision. 23
5. Allocation of Severance Taxes and Royalties to Parishes
Article VII, section 4(D) allocates state severance tax to the parishes
as follows:
One third of the sulphur severance tax but not to exceed one
hundred thousand dollars; one-fifth of the severance tax on all
natural resources, other than sulphur or timber, but not to exceed
five hundred thousand dollars; and three-fourths of the timber
severance tax shall be remitted to the parish in which severance
or production occurs. 24
6. Allocation of Royalties to Parishes
The Louisiana Constitution provides that:
One tenth of the royalties from mineral leases on state owned
land, lake and river beds and other water bottoms belonging to
the state or the title to which is in the public for mineral
21. La. R.S. 33:2711 (1988).
22. La. Const. art. VI, § 28. La. R.S. 47:341-363 (Supp. 1990) imposes the state
occupational license tax. La. R.S. 47:341 (Supp. 1990) empowers parishes "to impose a
license tax on any person conducting any business herein enumerated" provided two-
thirds of the elected members of the parochial governing authority approve the imposition.
23. La. Const. art. VII, § 4(C).
24. La. Const. art. VII, § 4(D). La. Const. of 1921, art. 10, § 21 (superceded 1974)
had set the maximum limits on severance taxes paid back to the parishes at $100,000.00
for sulphur and $200,000.00 for other minerals. La. R.S. 47:631 (1970) enacts the state
severance tax at rates established in La. R.S. 47:633 (1970 and Supp. 1990). La. R.S.
47:645 (Supp. 1990) mandates distribution to the parish in accordance with Article VII,
§ 4 of the Constitution.
19901
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development shall be remitted to the governing authority of the
parish in which severance or production occurs.25
7. Revenue Sharing Income to Parishes
Under the constitution, a minimum sum of $90,000,000.00 is "al-
located annually from the state general fund to the revenue sharing
fund.''26 This fund is distributed annually as provided by law to the
tax recipient bodies in each parish on a ratio that compares the pop-
ulation and number of homesteads in each parish to those in the state
as a whole.27 The revenue sharing reimbursement is designed to offset
current ad valorem tax losses of the local tax recipient bodies that result
from the homestead exemption granted by the constitution."
In 1985 approximately twenty-four percent of Louisiana's state budget
was allocated to local governments via state shared revenues and state
aid programs. This compared with a 1985 United States average of
thirty-five percent. 29 The situation has worsened dramatically since 1985.
C. Parish and/or Judicial District Offices Established by the
Constitution
The judicial branch of Louisiana government is established in article
V of the constitution, which establishes district courts with "original
jurisdiction of all civil and criminal matters." 30 Judicial districts existing
on the effective date of the constitution are specifically retained. Judicial
districts may be created, divided, or merged by law with approval "in
a referendum in each district and parish affected."'"
Each judicial district is constitutionally required to elect a district
attorney who "shall have charge of every criminal prosecution by the
state in his district" and is "the legal advisor to the grand jury."3 a2 An
informed observer may be surprised to learn that justice of the peace
courts with powers established by law are also enshrined in the consti-
tution.33
25. La. Const. art. VII, § 4(E). Specifics regarding distribution are in La. R.S. 30:145
(1989).
26. La. Const. art. 7, § 26(B).
27. Id. at § 26(C).
28. Id.
29. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances in 1985, Series 6F85, States
Finances, 1985, Table 11, U.S. Government Printing Office (1986).
30. La. Const. art. V, § 16.
31. Id.
32. La. Const. art. V, § 26.
33. Id. at § 20.
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The informed observer would certainly be surprised to learn that
the judiciary article provides that each parish shall elect a sheriff,3 4 a
clerk of court," and a coroner. a6 He would doubtless be even more
surprised to learn that the revenue and finance article provides that each
parish except Orleans, which elects seven assessors, shall elect a tax
assessor.37 Finally, he would be astonished to learn that the elections
article provides that the "governing authority of each parish shall appoint
a registrar of voters, whose compensation ... shall be provided by
law.'3 Thus, the whole panoply of the parish courthouse officialdom
enjoys constitutional status.
In no case is the parish governing authority given any voice in
determining the salary and emoluments due to the judicial and parish
constitutional officials for whom they must provide facilities. The con-
stitution grants no budgetary power to the parish governing authority
over the operational expenditures of these constitutional offices.
Finally, the constitution is silent as to how the general fiscal re-
sponsibilities of the parish governing authorities are to be reconciled
with the constitutional scheme that provides that salaries and emoluments
of most parish officers are to be established by state law.
III. MYRIAD LOUISIANA STATUTES MANDATE PAYMENT OF OPERATING
EXPENSES FOR A WIDE RANGE OF STATE AND PARISH OFFICIALS BY THE
PARISH GOVERNING AUTHORITY WITHOUT PROVIDING SOURCES OF
REVENUE TO PAY THE MANDATED EXPENSES
The state legislature has imposed upon the parish governing au-
thorities a plethora of statutory mandates to pay expenses incurred by
state and parish officials who are not subject to effective budgetary
control by the parish legislative body. Moreover, none of these statutory
mandates to pay expenses provide a corresponding source of funds to
pay the mandated expenses. Over the years, well organized lobbies of
local officials have found it easy to convince the state legislature that
their mandated expense allowances should be increased because the leg-
islature did not have to find the revenues to pay the increased expenses
it imposed upon parish governments.
To illustrate the magnitude of the problem that has thereby been
created for parish governing bodies, it is instructive to consider the
mandates in some detail by category.
34. Id. at § 27.
35. Id. at § 28.
36. Id. at § 29.
37. La. Const. art. VII, § 24.
38. La. Const. art. XI, § 5.
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A. Judicial Offices Entitled to Mandated Expenses
Parish payment of judicial officer's salaries raises serious issues of
separation of powers meriting separate treatment below. But mere rec-
itation of the judicial expenses imposed upon parish government by state
law illustrates that these costs of performing judicial business, items that
one would otherwise suppose were part of the state criminal and civil
legal system, are an imposing burden on parish government fiscs.
Governing authorities of the parishes within multiparish juvenile
detention districts across the state are required by statute to appropriate
annually amounts to support juvenile detention homes.3 9 They must also
pay the following court related costs: jurors and witness fees in all
criminal cases,40 civil pauper cases,4' and juvenile cases;42 daily attendance
fees for the sheriff's deputies who serve as court bailiffs, 43 and ap-
pearance fees for all police officers called as witnesses in criminal cases;"
plus court reporter's salaries and transcript fees.
Parish governments must also pay a fee for attending court to the
clerk of court's deputies who serve as minute clerks, 45 any amount of
the clerk of court's minimum salary not covered by the clerk's salary
fund," and "all necessary office furniture, equipment and record books"
requested by the clerk.4 7 Each parish government must provide "a suit-
able building and requisite furniture for the . . . district and circuit
courts," as well as offices, furniture, and equipment needed by the
clerks, recorders, sheriffs, tax collectors, and assessors.4
Expenses of the district attorney's office, as well as mandated por-
tions of the salaries of the district attorney and his assistants, must be
paid by the parish governments.49 The parish must also pay for expenses
of extraditing criminals from other states0 and for expenses incurred
as a result of the arrest, confinement, maintenance, and prosecution of
prisoners."
Salaries of justices of the peace and constables-anachronistic offices
that serve little or no function in most cases-are set by state statute,
39. La. R.S. 46:1938 (1982).
40. La. R.S. 15:251, 253, and 254 (1981).
41. La. R.S. 13:3661, 3662, and 3671 (Supp. 1990).
42. La. R.S. 13:1585 (1983 and Supp. 1990).
43. La. R.S. 33:1430 (1988).
44. See, e.g., La. R.S. 15:254.4 (1981), which provides $15.00 per day compensation
for off duty law enforcement officers called to testify in the twenty-seventh judicial district.
45. La. R.S. 13:846 (Supp. 1990).
46. La. R.S. 13:782(D) (1983).
47. La. R.S. 13:784(A) (1983).
48. La. R.S. 33:4713 (1988).
49. La. R.S. 16:6 (1982). See infra text accompanying notes 153-97.
50. La. Code Crim. P. art. 279.
51. La. R.S. 15:304 (1981).
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but must be paid by parish governments, 2 which realize no revenue
whatsoever from the justice of the peace courts.
Because parish governments paid a portion of district judges' salaries
until 1976,11 and still pay a portion of city judges' salaries,5 4 beleaguered
parish governments must deplete their meager general fund budgets by
paying a pro rata share of the monthly judicial retirement benefits of
all retired judges who served in judicial office before the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974 and 1976 Louisiana Acts No. 518 converted the
judges' pension plans from unfunded programs to pensions funded by
judicial salaries."
Parish governments have also been victimized by the occasional
"special retirement bills" that have rendered most Louisiana govern-
mental retirement funds a shambles by qualifying particular individuals,
who would not qualify under the general retirement law to receive
retirement benefits, by legislative fiat. For example, in 1974 a law Was
passed that effectively ordered the St. Landry Parish Police Jury to pay
a pension of two-thirds of his monthly salary to a defeated city judge
who did not qualify for retirement benefits under either the unfunded
judicial retirement plan or the funded judicial pension plan payable
through the Louisiana State Employees Retirement System.5 6
B. Coroner's Mandated Expenses
Coroner's fees for viewing bodies, performing autopsies, issuing
papers in an interdiction or commitment, investigating, and examining
for mental or physical disabilities as well as the coroner's expert fees 7
must be paid by parish government primarily at rates set by state law. 58
The parish must also pay expert witness fees to the coroner's deputies
or assistants when they testify in their official capacity.5 9
The statute imposing the obligation for payment of the coroner's
fees upon parishes or municipalities, depending whether the situs of the
52. La. R.S. 33:1702 (1988).
53. 1976 La. Acts No. 518 (codified as amended at La. R.S. 13:11-30 (1983)). See
State ex rel. Guste v. City of New Orleans, 363 So. 2d 678, 683-84 (La. 1978).
54. La. R.S. 13:1874-1875 (1983 and Supp. 1990).
55. La. R.S. 13:11-26 (1983 and Supp. 1990). For instance, the St. Landry Parish
Police Jury must now pay from the parish general fund the sum of $385.42 per month
for a retired judge of the Opelousas City Court and $823.82 per month for a retired
judge of the Eunice City Court. Source: Letter from Charles Richard, St. Landry Parish
Treasurer dated January 4, 1990.
56. 1974 La. Acts No. 305 (codified as amended at La. R.S. 13:8 (1983 and Supp.
1990)).
57. La. R.S. 33:1560 (Supp. 1990).
58. La. R.S. 33:1555-1556 (1988 and Supp. 1990).
59. La. R.S. 33:1561 (Supp. 1990).
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coroner's service was inside or outside the municipality, 60 seems to
provide some latitude for local governing bodies by allowing them to
set the rates payable within statutory maximum and minimum limits.
However, in the recent case of Reynolds v. City of Pineville,6' the court
held that the limited rate-setting discretion granted by the statute did
not allow a local governing body to escape liability for the coroner's
expenses by simply refusing to set the rates to be paid.
C. City Court's Mandated Expenses
Salaries of a city court judge must be paid in equal proportion by
the parish and city that are the situs of the court if the population of
the jurisdiction is less than 100,000,62 but the city pays all the city
judge's salary if the population of the jurisdiction is more than 100,000.63
The city court statutes are replete with special mandates for judge's
salaries. 64
City court marshal's salaries are set at a minimum of $3,600.00
payable in equal proportion by the parish and the city if the population
of the jurisdiction is less than 10,000. In larger jurisdictions, the marshal
must be paid by the governing bodies of both city and parish in varying
amounts" with special statutes making specific salary provisions for
particular courts."
Mandatory minimum salaries are also set for the city court clerks
and deputy clerks. 67 The statutes have generally saddled the cities rather
than the parishes with the burden of paying city court operating ex-
penses."
D. Election Officials' Mandated Expenses
Parish governing authorities must pay a portion of the salary of
the registrar of voters according to a schedule established by statute69
and must furnish him with an office either in or in close proximity to
the courthouse, as well as all equipment, supplies, furniture, books,
stationery, and other expenses for the operation of his office. 70 Portions
60. La. R.S. 33:1558 (1988).
61. 546 So. 2d 338 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 551 So. 2d 631 (1989).
62. La. R.S. 13:1874 (Supp. 1990).
63. La. R.S. 13:1874(B) (1983).
64. La. R.S. 13:1871-2488.78 (1983 and Supp. 1990).
65. La. R.S. 13:1883(C) (1983).
66. La. R.S. 13:1871-2488.78 (1983 and Supp. 1990).
67. La. R.S. 13:1888 (1983).
68. La. R.S. 13:1889-2488.78 (1983 and Supp. 1990).
69. La. R.S. 18:55 (Supp. 1990).
70. La. R.S. 18:132 (1979).
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of the salaries of the registrar's chief deputies and confidential assistants
must also be paid,' plus salaries of such additional temporary personnel
as the registrar requires. 72 The statutes even set the number of permanent
employees each registrar is entitled to hire (whose salaries must then be
paid at least in part by the parish). 7
The parish must pay for all costs of the registrar's annual canvass
of one-fourth of the parish voters74 and for the registrar's special counsel. 71
Finally, the parish must pay a per diem to members of the parish Board
of Election Supervisors to prepare for and supervise elections. 76
E. Assessor's Mandated Expenses
The cost of furniture, maps, and supplies needed by the tax assessors
are borne proportionately by all taxing bodies in the parish under the
traditional modus operandi of Louisiana parish government. 7 These
items are purchased by the parish governing body and billed to the
other taxing bodies.7 8
The salaries and expense allowances of parish assessors are enu-
merated in state statutes. 79 Each taxing body in a parish contributes a
pro-rata share to payment of the assessor's salary and expenses in
proportion to their percentage of the total ad valorem tax collection of
the parish. The sheriff remits the amounts due directly to the assessor
from the first taxes collected each year. 0
Some relief from payment of the assessor's office expenses is af-
forded to the parish governing body in those parishes where the assessor
has availed himself of the prerogative to finance his office by means
of a millage levied on the assessed valuation of all property on the tax
rolls of a statutorily created "Assessment District.''8
F. Obligation to Provide Quarters for Court and Parish Officers,
Courthouse, and a Jail
Parish governing bodies must provide "a suitable building" and
requisite furniture and equipment for the district and circuit courts, as
71. La. R.S. 18:59(B), (F) (Supp. 1990).
72. La. R.S. 18:59(I) (Supp. 1990).
73. La. R.S. 18.59.2 (Supp. 1990).
74. La. R.S. 18:192 (Supp. 1990).
75. La. R.S. 18:64 (1979).
76. La. R.S. 18:423(E) (Supp. 1990).
77. La. R.S. 33:4713 (1988).
78. Id.
79. La. R.S. 47:1907-1911 (Supp. 1990).
80. La. R.S. 47:1906 (Supp. 1990).
81. La. R.S. 47:1925.1 (Supp. 1990).
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well as for the clerk of court, the sheriff, and the assessor, plus "nec-
essary heat and illumination" for such quarters.8 2 This mandate does
not specifically extend to provision of air-conditioning, which is now
the norm for all parish offices. Each parish government is obligated to
provide "a good and sufficient courthouse, with rooms for jurors, and
a good and sufficient jail."'8 3
G. Obligation to Provide Care, Feeding, and Transportation of
Prisoners
In 1976, Act 689 created law enforcement districts with boundaries
coterminous with the boundaries of each parish, except Orleans, for the
purpose of providing financing to parish sheriffs. 4 An ad valorem tax
sufficient to produce the same revenue in 1977 that the sheriff's com-
mission on ad valorem taxes had produced in 1976 through 1977 was
statutorily levied on all property appearing on the tax rolls of each
parish from 1977 onward.8" All this was done without a vote of the
people, the normal sine qua non of imposition of an ad valorem tax
on parish residents, which is an explicit tribute to the political power
of the Louisiana sheriffs. With voter approval, a sheriff can obtain
additional millages or sales taxes for his law enforcement district.8 6
With an independent financial base, the sheriffs would appear to
be in a favorable position to relieve parish governing bodies of some
of their mandated obligations. Alas, this has not happened. Instead, in
the landmark case of Amiss v. Dumas, s7 the first circuit held that while
the sheriff, as warden of the parish jail, has the statutory duty of
operating the parish jail and seeing to it that the prisoners are properly
cared for, fed, and clothed,88 it is the financial obligation of the parish
governing body to provide the food, clothing, medical treatment, supplies
necessary for routine cleaning and daily maintenance, minor appliances,
and even utensils necessary to prepare the prisoners' food. 9
Parish governments are responsible for the maintenance of all parish
jails and must pass regulations for policing and governing those jails.9
Minimum state standards of health and decency, as well as prescribed
building and maintenance requirements must be met by parish jails.9
82. La. R.S. 33:4713 (1988).
83. La. R.S. 33:4715 (1988).
84. La. R.S. 33:9001 (Supp. 1990).
85. La. R.S. 33:9003(A) (1988).
86. Id.
87. 411 So. 2d 1137 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 415 So. 2d 940 (1982).
88. La. R.S. 15:704-705 (1981 arid Supp. 1990).
89. Amiss v. Dumas, 411 So. 2d at 1141 (citing La. R.S. 15:304 (1981)).
90. La. R.S. 15:702 (1981).
91. La. R.S. 15:751, 763 (1981).
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A physician must be appointed to attend sick prisoners and his
salary paid by parish governing bodies. 92 The sheriff is allowed twelve
and a half cents per day for each sick prisoner. 93
The third circuit court of appeal has held that the police jury-not
the sheriff-is responsible for the hospital bills incurred by a prisoner
who was severely beaten in the parish jail, even though the prisoner
had been sentenced to the Department of Corrections and was neither
awaiting trial nor serving a parish jail sentence. 94
For keeping and feeding parish prisoners in jail, parish governments
must compensate the sheriffs not less than $3.50 per diem for each
parish prisoner. The Louisiana Department of Corrections pays the
sheriff $18.50 per day for each prisoner who has been convicted of a
crime and sentenced to the state penitentiary, but is still held in the
parish jail. 95
Finally, if the sheriff obtains approval of the district judge to keep
up to four dogs for chasing fugitives, the sheriff may purchase such
dogs at parish expense for up to $500.00 each plus pay up to $20.00
per month for each dog's maintenance and training.96
H. Mandated Civil Defense Expenses
Civil defense would appear to be an area of unique state respon-
sibility. However, Louisiana parishes and municipalities are directed to
establish a local civil defense organization and to employ a director of
civil defense who is appointed by the state civil defense director upon
recommendation of the parish or municipal governing authority.9 7
Thus, without hyperbole one may conclude that the Louisiana sta-
tutes impose upon parish governing bodies mandated obligations: (a) to
pay salaries of a host of employees whom they do not employ at pay
rates that the governing bodies do not control; (b) to provide quarters
and equipment for state officials, such as voter registrars, district at-
torneys, and judges who should be maintained at state expense; (c) to
provide quarters and equipment for parish officers whose offices are
established by the state constitution and whose financial resources exceed
those of most parish governing bodies; and (d) to feed, clothe, house,
and care for everyone from parish grand jurors, petit jurors, and pri-
soners to the sheriff's bloodhounds.
92. La. R.S. 15:703 (1981).
93. La. R.S. 15:705 (Supp. 1990).
94. Southwest Louisiana Hosp. Ass'n v. Hunt, 551 So. 2d 818 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1989).
95. La. R.S. 15:556 and 824 (1981 and Supp. 1990).
96. La. R.S. 33:1438-39 (1988).
97. La. R.S. 29:608 (1989).
1990]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
IV. MANDATED EXPENSE CONFLICTS IN OTHER STATES
Local governments in other states have experienced mandated expense
problems similar to those experienced by Louisiana parish governments.
According to Congressional Quarterly's monthly journal of state and
local government activity, efforts at coping with the problem "range
from simply cataloging mandates to requiring estimates of their costs
to mandatory reimbursement of mandates." 98
In an effort to discover what mandates are on the books, South
Carolina's Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations pro-
duced a catalog of mandated expenses that revealed 695 current ad-
ministrative and legislative mandates imposed on local governments by
the state government of South Carolina. 99
There are forty-two states that require any proposed legislation
mandating action by local government to include a "fiscal note" ana-
lyzing the financial impact the proposal will have before the legislature
acts on the bill."°° Fourteen states require the state to reimburse local
government for the costs of mandates.' 0' For instance, under the Mas-
sachusetts mandate reimbursement program, any city, town, or group
of ten taxpayers can challenge any state law or administrative regulation
that costs the local government more money. Challenges are reviewed
by the Massachusetts Division of Local Mandates who may order the
state to reimburse the local government. If the local government is not
reimbursed, it may petition the courts for permission not to comply
with unfunded mandates. 02 California has a similar process available to
local governments-appeals for funding to the Commission on State
Mandates and ultimate redress in court for claims denied by the Com-
mission. 103
During the 1989 Regular Session of the Louisiana legislature, Senator
Jon D. Johnson of New Orleans proposed an amendment to article VI,
section 14 of the Louisiana Constitution that provided generally that,
with a few stated exceptions, "no law requiring increased expenditures
for any purpose shall become effective within a political subdivision"
until approved by ordinance or resolution adopted "by the governing
authority of the affected political subdivision or until a law provides
for a local source of revenue within the affected political subdivision
for the purpose."'' 4 Under Senator Johnson's proposed constitutional
98. The Mandate Blues, Governing: The States and Localities, Cong. Q., (Sept. 1989),
at 27.
99. Id. at 28.
100. Id. at 29.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 30.
103. Id.
104. S.B. 55, 15th Reg. Sess., La. Leg. (1989).
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amendment, any law increasing local expenditures would have been
effective "only to the extent and amount" of the revenue that the local
political subdivision was allowed to collect. 05
Senator Johnson's bill was referred to the Senate Committee on
Local and Municipal Affairs from which it was reported out favorably
and passed in the Senate."'6 When the bill was sent to the House of
Representatives, Senator Johnson's bill was referred to the House Gov-
ernmental Affairs Committee, which deferred action on the bill, effec-
tively killing it for the 1989 session. 0 7 Given the salience of the mandated
expense issue, one may confidently predict a similar measure will be
proposed again in 1990.
V. GENERAL LAW REQUIRES PARISH BUDGETS TO BE BALANCED AND
TO PROVIDE FOR PAYMENT OF STATUTORY CHARGES WITH PRIORITY
A. General Revenue Laws
Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:2921 provides:
No police jury nor any municipal corporation shall, in any one
year, make any appropriation of, approve any claim against, or
make any expenditure from annual revenue for that year, if the
appropriation, approved claim, or expenditure, separately or
together with other appropriations, approved claims, or expen-
ditures, is in excess of the estimated revenue of that year.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:2922 provides:
A. The annual revenues of any political subdivision (which term
shall mean those units of local government listed in Subsection
2 of Section 44 of Article VI of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974) shall be dedicated as follows: first, all statutory charges
shall be paid from the respective funds upon which they are
imposed; second, all charges for services rendered annually under
time contracts; third, all necessary and usual charges provided
for by ordinance or resolution. Any excess of revenue above
such statutory, necessary and usual charges may be applied to
the payments of amounts due and unpaid out of the revenues
of former years.
105. Id.
106. The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 31 to 3. Journal, La. S., 15th Reg.
Sess., May 30, 1989, at 35.
107. In the House, Senate Bill 55 was referred to the Committee on House and
Governmental Affairs. Journal, La. H.R., 15th Reg. Sess., May 30, 1989 at 3. Minutes
of the Committee on House and Governmental Affairs for June 8, 1989, show action
on the bill deferred to be rescheduled, however, the bill was not rescheduled.
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Police jurors are subject to fines and imprisonment for authorizing
expenditures that exceed revenue. 08 Moreover, police juries cannot incur
debt without providing a means of paying principal and interest in the
ordinance creating the debt."° The police jury may borrow to meet a
public emergency, but "repayment of sums borrowed shall be a fixed
charge upon the revenues of the year next following the year in which
the sums are borrowed."" 0
Parishes may anticipate revenues in any given year, borrow money
to pay current expenses, and issue certificates of indebtedness to cover
the loan."' However, the amount borrowed by any parish cannot exceed
the estimated income of the parish for that year as reflected by the
annual budget previously adopted." 2 Tax income collected after issuance
of certificates of indebtedness must be dedicated and set aside for
payment of outstanding certificates of indebtedness as they mature." 3
No parish can incur debt, issue bonds or certificates of indebtedness,
or do any type of borrowing without prior approval of the State Bond
and Tax Board."14
B. Local Government Budget Act
In 1980, Act 504 added the Louisiana Local Government Budget
Act to the revised statutes. It applies inter alia to "a parish; ... registrar
of voters; independently elected parish offices, including the office of
assessor, clerk of district court, coroner, district attorney, sheriff and
judges, but only insofar as their judicial expense funds.""15 The Budget
Act expressly applies to political subdivisions operating under a home
rule charter." 6
The Local Government Budget Act requires each parish governing
body or official to prepare "a comprehensive budget presenting a com-
plete financial plan for the ensuing fiscal year for the general fund and
each special revenue fund.""11 7 In the proposed budget the "total of
proposed expenditures shall not exceed the total of estimated funds
available for the ensuing fiscal year.""' In case there is any misunder-
108. La. R.S. 33:2925 (1988) says officers violating La. R.S. 33:2921-2924 are subject
to a fine of up to $1,000.00 and/or imprisonment' of up to one year.
109. La. R.S. 33:2926 (1988).
110. La. R.S. 33:2924 (1988).
111. La. R.S. 39:745 (1989).
112. La. R.S. 39:746 (1989).
113. Id.
114. La. R.S. 47:1803 (1952), repealed by La. Acts No. 662 (1989) (effective July 1,
1989).
115. La. R.S. 39:1302 (1989).
116. La. R.S. 39:1303(C) (1989).
117. La. R.S. 39:1304(A) (1989 and Supp. 1990).
118. La. R.S. 39:1304(E) (1989).
[Vol. 50
PARISH POLICE JURY EXPENSES
standing, the Budget Act reiterates that when the proposed budget is
presented for adoption "the adopted budget shall be balanced with
approved expenditures not exceeding the total of estimated funds avail-
able."')9
If there is any lingering doubt that the Budget Act prohibits deficit
spending it is dispelled by the provision concerned with the process of
amending the budget: "In no event shall a budget amendment be adopted
proposing expenditures which exceed the total estimated funds available
for the fiscal year."' 2
In order to forestall deficit spending, the chief executive of the
parish is obliged to notify the parish governing authority in writing
when "actual expenditures plus projected expenditures for the remainder
of the year, within a fund, are exceeding the estimated budgeted ex-
penditures by five percent or more."''
Finally, the Budget Act provides that "any person may commence
a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction for the parish in which [the]
... governing authority" of the parish "is domiciled for mandamus,
injunctive, or declaratory relief to require compliance with the provisions
of' the Act. 122
Thus, one can readily envision a situation in which the parish
governing authority could be impaled on the horns of a statutory di-
lemma because:
(a) a parish official whose office expenses are statutory charges
of the parish governing authority seeks a mandamus to compel
payment; but
(b) an outraged taxpayer seeks an injunction pursuant to Louis-
iana Revised Statutes 39:1314 to prohibit the parish governing
authority from paying the parish official's requested office ex-
penses because to do so would result in a deficit.
One may confidently project that this scenario will occur sooner rather
than later.
The prohibition against parish budget deficits embodied in Louisiana
Revised Statutes 33:2921 has been part of Louisiana law since 1877,123
doubtless inspired by the fiscal excesses of the Reconstruction era. The
Louisiana Supreme Court early in this century recognized the standing
119. La. R.S. 39:1308(B) (1989).
120. La. R.S. 39:1309 (1989).
121. La. R.S. 39:1310 (1989 and Supp. 1990).
122. La. R.S. 39:1314 (1989) (emphasis added).
123. 1877 La. Acts No. 30, § 1 provided: "No police jury of any parish ... shall
make any appropriation of money for any year which appropriation separately, or together
with any other appropriation or appropriations of the same year, shall be in excess of
the actual revenue of said parish . . . for that year."
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of taxpayers to restrain illegal parish expenditures in violation of the
state statute.124
Long before the constitution of 1974 prohibited seizure of public
funds to satisfy a judgment,121 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
mandamus would not lie to compel Jefferson Parish to appropriate
money to pay a judgment it owed to the City of Gretna where the
parish budget would otherwise consume all estimated income for the
year. 126
C. Statutory Charges Must Be Paid With Priority
Three cases have applied the provision of Louisiana Revised Statutes
39:2922 requiring that statutory charges be paid with preference over
other "necessary and usual charges" of local government.
1. Penny v. Bowden
In Penny v. Bowden,127 a retired city policeman brought suit to
compel the City of Alexandria to pay into the police pension fund
amounts due under the state statute establishing the fund. Among other
defenses raised by the city was a claim that "since its current operating
expenses as budgeted and appropriated by the City Council meet or
exceed its yearly revenues from various sources, there are no funds
available to satisfy the deficit in the retirement fund."'
The third circuit court of appeal reversed the trial court's decision
for the City of Alexandria on the grounds that the current operating
expenses budgeted and appropriated by the city council did not stand
on an equal footing with the city's paramount statutory obligation to
pay any deficit in the municipal policemen's retirement fund on an
annual basis. Providing enhanced sanitation service, police protection,
fire protection, and utility services by the city council was deemed
discretionary by the court; however:
the duty to appropriate and pay any yearly deficit which occurs
in the operation of the policemen's retirement fund is a statutory
duty imposed by the will of the Legislature on the municipality.
Our system of local government contemplates that statutory
charges imposed on a municipality by the Legislature take prec-
edence over a more permissive use of municipal funds, and it
is settled that the State has the power to require a municipality
124. Murphy v. Police Jury, St. Mary Parish, 118 La. 401, 42 So. 979 (1907).
125. La. Const. Art. 12, § 10.
126. City of Gretna v. Parish of Jefferson, 161 La. 406, 108 So. 787 (1926).
127. Penny v. Bowden, 199 So. 2d 345 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
128. Id. at 351.
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to set up and appropriate money to a pension system... .129
We are of the opinion, therefore, that though in the City Coun-
cil's view the Council might better serve the inhabitants of the
city by allocating the proceeds from the ad valorem tax to other
functions, the will of the Legislature in this regard is supreme
and must be obeyed. 30
As a matter of public policy, it is hard to justify the court of
appeal's thesis that policemen's rights to a particular level of pension
payments should prevail over the rights of the citizenry as a whole to
an adequate number of policemen to provide for public safety. Doubtless
a plebiscite on that ranking of priorities would result in a conclusion
different from the court's opinion in Penny v. Bowden, which appears
on its face to be the antithesis of the home rule power envisioned by
the 1974 Louisiana Constitution.
Providing sanitation is a basic raison d'etre for local government.
In the constellation of values espoused by the average citizen of Al-
exandria, one is constrained to believe that the city government's re-
sponsibility to maintain an adequate sewage system would rank
considerably ahead of a deficit in the police pension system as a concern.
Yet, under the Bowden rationale, the opposite result is sanctified.
2. Citizens, Electors, and Taxpayers of Tangipahoa Parish v.
Layrisson
In Citizens, Electors and Taxpayers v. Layrisson,3 ' the plaintiff filed
suit against the Sheriff and the Police Jury of Tangipahoa Parish
to enjoin them from dedicating a portion of the parish's general fund
revenues for the next twenty years to cover the parish's share of the
cost of constructing a new jail pursuant to a statutory scheme whereby
the state sold the bonds to finance the jail, but the parish had to provide
thirty percent reimbursement of the bond debt. The court of appeal
upheld the dismissal of the sheriff as an improper party to the suit.
Regarding the suit against the police jury, the court of appeal found
that the trial court was correct in enjoining the Tangipahoa Parish Police
Jury from dedicating excess general revenue funds for twenty years
because Louisiana Revised Statutes 39:2922 "prohibits dedication of
excess general fund revenues, when available, for more than ten years.' ' 32
The court then dealt with appellants' contention that building a jail was
129. Citing State ex rel. Sewerage & Water Bd. v. Comm'n Council of New Orleans,
151 La. 938, 92 So. 392 (1922).
130. 199 So. 2d at 351.
131. 449 So. 2d 613 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 452 So. 2d 170 (1984).
132. Id. at 616.
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either a "statutory charge" or a "necessary and usual charge" as defined
by Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:2922, thus granting the expenditure
priority in funding. While admitting that parish governing authorities
have a statutorily imposed duty to provide a "good and sufficient"
courthouse and jail,133 the Layrisson court concluded that expenses of
providing a jail were not a "statutory charge" under Article 2922, as
was the duty to deposit money in the police pension fund in Bowden,
because unlike the Bowden obligation it did not involve "a determinable
sum to be paid."' 13 4
It appears that the Layrisson court was incorrect in failing to find
that the expense of providing a jail was at least a "necessary and usual
charge" of the parish budget. At any rate, Layrisson firmly established
that the strictures of Article 2922 against pledging parish general fund
revenues to pay non-priority items will be judicially enforced.
3. St. Landry Parish Police Jury v. Clerk of Court of St.
Landry Parish, et al.
In 1986, the St. Landry Parish Police Jury filed suit against fifty-
four elected or appointed parish officials "5 seeking a judgment: (a)
declaring that a balanced budget proposed by the police jury that cut
or eliminated allocations for the defendants' operations was in compli-
ance with state law and (b) preventing enforcement of defendants' budg-
etary requests. The parish court reporters 36 and clerk of court' 7
subsequently brought mandamus actions against the police jury seeking
funding of salaries and expenditures; the three cases were consolidated.
Anticipated expenses for the 1987 fiscal year were $2,011,879.00,
while anticipated revenues were $1,602,254.00. Therefore, the St. Landry
Parish Police Jury was facing a potential deficit of $409,625.00 in 1987.
In order to balance its budget, the police jury reduced all mandated
expense items twenty-two percent across the board. Realizing that these
133. La. R.S. 33:4715 (1988).
134. 449 So. 2d at 617.
135. St. Landry Parish Police Jury v. Clerk of Court, 536 So. 2d 1283, 1284 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1988), writ denied, 537 So. 2d 1172 (La. 1989). Among the defendants
were the St. Landry Parish Clerk of Court, the judges of the twenty-seventh judicial
district; the Coroner; the parish justices of the peace; the parish constable; the District
Attorney of the twenty-seventh judicial district; city court judges, marshals and clerks,
the twenty-seventh judicial district court reporters, the parish registrar of voters, the
sheriff, the parish county agent, and a retired pensioner who was former judge of the
Ward 1 Court.
136. Cambre v. St. Landry Parish Police Jury, 536 So. 2d 1289 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1988), writ denied, 537 So. 2d 1172 (1989).
137. St. Landry Parish Clerk of Court v. St. Landry Parish Police Jury, 536 So. 2d
1289 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1988), writ denied, 537 So. 2d 1172 (1989).
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items were statutorily mandated, the police jury sought a declaratory
judgment asking the court in essence to rule that its single obligation
to submit a balanced budget under Louisiana Revised Statutes 39:1304
predominated over its multiple statutory obligations to pay expenses.
However, the district court neatly sidestepped the issue by finding:
(1) $697,827.00 of the budgeted expenses of the police jury were
not statutorily mandated;
(2) Therefore, the police jury had no deficit, but a surplus of
anticipated revenues over anticipated mandatory expenses of
$288,202.00;
(3) The defendant parish officials were entitled to judgment
granting their exceptions of prematurity and no cause of action;
and
(4) The St. Landry Parish Clerk of Court and Court Reporters
were entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the police jury
to pay their expense claims.'38
Thus, by failing to find a deficit, the district court completely avoided
grappling with the central issue raised by the police jury's suit: how
does one reconcile the statutory command to avoid a budget deficit with
multiple statutory commands to pay expenses that create a deficit sit-
uation.
Faced with the same issue, the third circuit court of appeal approved
the circumvention crafted by the district court even unto its verbiage
by adopting that part of the trial court opinion sustaining the St. Landry
Parish officials' exceptions of prematurity and no cause of action. In
its opinion, the trial court adhered to the distinction first enunciated in
Bowden and Layrisson between "statutory charges" and "general stat-
utory duties," saying:
Under these cases, a "statutory charge," within the meaning of
R.S. 33:2922 is one fixed by statute at a specified or determinable
sum to be paid and is distinguished from a general statutory
duty upon a police jury to provide a courthouse and jail and
other services and facilities.'3 9
Employing this narrow definition of "statutory charges," the court
of appeal affirmed the trial court's factual finding that the following
parish government expenses were not mandated statutory charges:
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION:
1. Salaries $105,424.00
2. Police Jury Office Expenses 25,000.00
138. 536 So. 2d at 1285.
139. Id. at 1286.
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3. Telephone Service 35,000.00
4. Unemployment Contributions 16,000.00
5. Insurance Premiums 160,000.00
6. Employer Portion of Employee 54,750.00
Group Ins.
7. Liability Claims Defense and 100,000.00
Judgments
GENERAL GOVERNMENT
BUILDINGS:
1. Salary $ 68,928.00
2. Utilities-Courthouse Bldg. 41,000.00
3. Maintenance of Courthouse Bldg. 58,685.00
and Grounds
4. Utilities-Public Service Center 20,000.00
5. Maintenance of Public Service 13,040.001-
Center
Numerous logical problems arise when one parses the analysis of
parish expenses in the St. Landry Parish case. First and foremost, how
do the court reporters, the clerk of court, and the other recipients of
statutory charges function absent a courthouse where the utilities are
on and the grass is cut? Yet, the St. Landry Parish court precludes
payment for these items until "statutory charges," such as the court
reporters' transcript fees and salaries, are paid. This is true even if there
is no money left to pay the light bill for the courthouse. Paradox is
not usually the desired goal of law, but surely it is paradoxical to
envision the fully paid court reporters typing transcripts in the dark, or
the clerk of court walking through knee high grass to get to his office
from the parking lot. Unfortunately, this is the reductio ad absurdem
of the court's logic.
Second, the logic of the St. Landry Parish case is inscrutable when
it finds the clerk of court entitled to a writ of mandamus presumably
because his claim for expenses of his office were "statutory charges"
entitled to payment with preference over, inter alia, the fire insurance
premiums for the courthouse. How can this be when the clerk's claim
for expenses arises from a statute that does not establish a "specified
or determinable sum" to be paid to the clerk, but only commands the
parish governing body to provide "all necessary office furniture, equipment
and record books" required by the clerk.' 4' That statutory command is
140. Id. at 1286-87.
141. La. R.S. 13:784 (1983 and Supp. 1990).
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no more "specified or determinable" than the statutory mandate to
provide "a good and sufficient" courthouse and jail that the Layrisson
court had denied status as a statutory charge because it did not "involve
a determinable sum to be paid.' 1 42
The third glaring defect in the reasoning of the St. Landry Parish
case centers around its denial of mandatory status to insurance premiums
and other payments for statutory entitlements of parish employees. Motor
vehicles owned by the parish governing body must be covered by liability
insurance to be driven in this state.143 Surely, automobile or truck liability
premiums "involve a determinable sum to be paid." Public employees
must be provided workmen's compensation either by insurance or a self-
insurance fund.'" How can the parish governing body meet its statutory
obligations to provide a courthouse and quarters for the assessor, the
clerk, the district attorney, and the sheriff if the courthouse burns down
and there are no funds to rebuild it? Practically speaking, fire insurance
on the courthouse and the jail is a sine qua non of provision of those
facilities. Moreover, payments of unemployment compensation taxes are
not optional, but mandatory under general law. ""
A fourth defect in the reasoning of the St. Landry Parish case is
its blithe dismissal of the police jury's contention that maintenance of
the parish governing body's offices, as such, are a sine qua non of the
very existence of the parish as a political body corporate. If nothing
else, the police jury must maintain an office at the parish seat for the
parish treasurer who must be appointed by the parish governing body.'4
The parish treasurer must maintain books of account showing all receipts
and expenditures of the parish and collect all debts due the parish. 47
Persons having claims against the parish must present them to the
treasurer who shall keep records thereof in "a well bound book.' ' 48 A
fortiori, there must be a parish office wherein such claims may be
presented. Without parish offices, where would citizens apply for and
receive liquor permits, building permits, subdivision licenses, and other
licenses that are issued by the parish for fees flowing into the parish
treasury? Existence' of parish government without parish offices is an
oxymoron.
142. Taxpayers of Tangipahoa Parish v. Layrisson, 449 So. 2d 613, 617 (La. App.
1st Cir.), writ denied, 452 So. 2d 170 (1984).
143. La. R.S. 32:861 and 863.1 (1989).
144. La. R.S. 23:104 (1985 and Supp. 1990).
145. La. R.S. 23:1471-1732 (1985 and Supp. 1990) sets out the unemployment com-
pensation law. La. R.S. 23:1472(10) (1985 and Supp. 1990) defines "employing unit" and
"employer" to include "the State of Louisiana or subdivisions." La. R.S. 23:1536 (1985
and Supp. 1990) sets out the current applicable rates.
146. La. R.S. 33:1632, 1651, 1653, and 1661 (1988).
147. La. R.S. 33:1654 and 1657 (1988).
148. La. R.S. 33:1658 (1988).
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For instance, the police jury is obligated to meet and appoint officers
on the second Monday in January after their election. 149 Surely, this
meeting is not to be held in the street. Without belaboring the obvious,
the St. Landry Parish case is flatly wrong in holding that expenses of
maintaining parish offices are not statutory charges.
The fifth major error in the St. Landry Parish case lies in the
failure of the court to recognize the correctness of the police jury's
position that the salaries of its members were expenses priming even
statutory charges because they were mandated by the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974. Article VI, section 12 of the constitution provides:
"Compensation of a local official shall not be reduced during the term
for which he is elected." But the third circuit dodged the issue by saying
that "even if we consider the salaries of the police jurors as being
mandated by the Constitution during their respective terms of office,
there is still an excess of revenues over other statutory charges."' 50
Faced with the dilemma created by a parish government without a
courthouse, the third circuit finally took refuge in the faulty logic of
its earlier analysis in Penny v. Bowden as follows:
As to the other items which the Exceptors contend are not
statutory charges, the Police Jury argues that there is general
statutory basis for all of these items. For instance, the Police
Jury argues that R.S. 33:4713 requires the Police Jury to bear
the expenses of suitable buildings, furniture and equipment for
the offices of the district courts and the clerks of court, tax
collectors, assessors, etc. Thus, the Police Jury argues that all
of these expenses shown above under General Administration
and General Government Buildings are statutory charges. The
answer to this argument is clearly set forth in the quotation
from Penny v. Bowden, supra. While all of these expenses may
be for usual and customary facilities and services, they are not
statutory charges and cannot be paid by the Police Jury until
all statutory charges have been satisfied.''
Ritualistic incantation of Penny v. Bowden does not solve the problem
raised when various mandated expense beneficiaries claim "statutory
charges" that, if paid, will deprive the parish governing authority of
its ability to provide a courthouse, parish offices, and its basic
accoutrements-all necessary to a seat of parish government. Proper
analysis in the St. Landry Parish case would have required the court
of appeal to provide rules for dealing with that fundamental dilemma-
149. La. R.S. 33:1226 (1988).
150. St. Landry Parish Police Jury v. Clerk of Court, 536 So. 2d 1283, 1287, writ
denied, 537 So. 2d 1172 (1989).
151. Id.
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which has not at this writing been dealt with by a Louisiana appellate
court.
Ironically, the St. Landry Parish case concluded by affirming the
power of the St. Landry Parish Clerk of Court and Court Reporters
to bring a petition for a writ of mandamus against the police jury to
compel payment of their mandated expense entitlements. 1 2 In so doing,
the court cited Louisiana Revised Statutes 39:1314, the provision of the
Local Government Budget Act that permits "any person" to sue a
governing authority seeking mandamus, injunctive, or declaratory relief
to require compliance with its provisions. Unfortunately, the court failed
to suggest how it would reconcile the future conflict that is bound to
occur when an official seeks mandamus for payment of his mandated
expenses that create a budget deficit, and an interested citizen seeks to
enjoin the parish government from paying those expenses and creating
a deficit forbidden by the Local Government Budget Act.
Thus, at this juncture, given the denial of writs by the supreme
court, the St. Landry Parish case answered some questions, but begged
the most important questions. The third circuit opinion establishes that
a number of expenses that are certainly necessary and proper to' the
conduct of parish government, such as police juror's salaries and payment
of utilities for the courthouse building, are not statutorily mandated.
Neither the trial court nor the court of appeal discussed the obvious
reductio ad absurdem presented by their analysis, i.e., how does one
maintain functional parish offices without a seat of parish government.
Put another way: how do a judge and court reporters function without
the lights on in the courthouse.
The police jury sought to raise exactly that issue in its declaratory
judgment suit and suggested that essential functions of government can
only be carried out in a courthouse where the police jury has kept the
lights on by dint of paying the parish's light bill. As courts are accustomed
to do with unresolved legal dilemmas, the court in the St. Landry Parish
case avoided the issue by simply failing to mention it. But just as
Banquo's ghost, it will not go away. When the lights were turned off
recently in the Tangipahoa Parish courthouse because the parish council
could not pay the bill,5 3 it was a harbinger of things to come.
Even the tool of mandamus used by the clerk of court in the St.
Landry Parish case will not be available to some future clerk who seeks
to compel parish government to get the lights turned on if payment of
the light bill would infringe upon money budgeted for payment of
statutorily mandated expenses; the light bill is not a mandated expense
under the St. Landry Parish case.
152. Id. at 1289.
153. See supra note 3.
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Nor, apparently, will mandamus lie to compel performance of a
ministerial duty that it is impossible to perform. Thus, one supposes
that a parish governing body cannot be ordered to pay even statutorily
mandated expenses, for example, court reporter's salaries, if there is no
money left in the parish bank account.
Perhaps such lingering realities were uppermost in the minds of the
Louisiana Supreme Court justices when they issued their opinion in Reed
v. Washington Parish Police Jury.15 4
VI. THE RULE OF REED V. WASHINGTON PAISH POLICE JuRY-A
DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S REQUEST FOR PAYMENT OF STATUTORY CHARGES
MUST BE REASONABLE
Unlike the court of appeal in the St. Landry Parish case, the
Louisiana Supreme Court in Reed v. Washington Parish Police Jury
provided a glimmer of hope to embattled parish governing authorities
across the state by establishing a rule that the budget requests of officials
entitled to appropriations of statutorily mandated expenses must be
reasonable in kind and amount. The case arose out of a situation in
which the district attorney filed a mandamus action to compel the police
jury to reimburse his office for 1986 fiscal year operational expenses
out of the parish general fund. Walter Reed's budget request was
$145,025.00, but the police jury budgeted only $42,246.12 for his office.
Unlike the St. Landry Parish Police Jury, the Washington Parish Police
Jury "did not contend it lacked sufficient funds to pay its statutorily
mandated expenses."' 55 The trial court granted the district attorney's
request but the court of appeal reversed. 15 6
As the supreme court framed it, the case required the court to
reconcile an apparent contradiction of terms within Louisiana Revised
Statutes 16:6, which provides:
The district attorneys of this state, the parish of Orleans
excepted, shall be entitled to an expense allowance for salaries
of stenographers, clerks and secretaries, and salaries or charges
for special officers, investigators and other employees and an
expense allowance for stationery forms, telephone, transporta-
tion, travel, postage, hotel and other expenses incurred in the
discharge of their official duties.
The police juries of the various parishes of the state of
Louisiana are hereby authorized to pay from their general fund
any of the items of expense, as provided for herein, incurred
154. 518 So. 2d 1044 (La. 1988).
155. Id. at 1045.
156. Reed v. Washington Parish Police Jury, 515 So. 2d 635 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
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by the several district attorneys of this state when acting in their
official capacities.
Thus, the supreme court had to decide whether the mandatory
"shall" or the precatory "are hereby authorized" expressed the true
legislative intent. The supreme court held "La. R.S. 16:6 places a
mandatory duty on the police jury to fund the ... expenses of the
district attorney's office."1 7 In order to reach its conclusion, the supreme
court had to dispose of several troublesome issues that cut to the core
of the political theory underlying the whole mandated expense problem.
A. Reconciling Mandatory and Permissive Language in a Statutory
Mandate
Initially, the Washington Parish Police Jury pointed out that, while
the first paragraph of Louisiana Revised Statutes 16:6 provides for a
mandatory expense allowance for district attorneys, the second paragraph
merely states that the police jury is "authorized" to pay the allowance.
Therefore, the police jury argued that payment of the expenses from
the parish general fund, rather than from some other source, was per-
missive not mandatory. It is important to note how the court dealt with
the police jury's argument because the myriad of laws creating statutory
charges often use mandatory and permissive terms in the same statute.
The supreme court solved this particular semantic puzzle by referring
to basic principles of statutory construction. The court said:
It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that
statutes must be interpreted in their entirety. The meaning of
a word in a statute must be determined in light of the statute
as a whole. There is a presumption that the legislature enacted
16:6 for some definite purpose and we must endeavor to construe
it so as to give it effect and accomplish the purpose for which
it was enacted. When a statute is susceptible of two interpre-
tations, a court must choose the one which affords a reasonable
and practical effect to the entire act over one which renders
part of it meaningless or useless.' 8
Reviewing the history of Louisiana Revised Statutes 16:6, the su-
preme court noted that beginning in 1938 when the legislature first
enacted the statute and continuing to the present day, the phrase "shall
be entitled to an expense allowance" appeared in every version and
always provided the district attorney with a mandatory expense allow-
ance. 159 Because it would be senseless to create a mandatory expense
157. 518 So. 2d at 1044-45.
158. Id. at 1046.
159. Id.
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allowance for the district attorney on one hand and allow the parish
governing authority not to pay it on the other hand, the supreme court
concluded that the legislature had another purpose in mind when it used
the permissive word "authorized" in the second paragraph of Louisiana
Revised Statutes 16:6.
The court defined the choice of the word "authorized" in the second
paragraph of section 6 to be:
[Niothing more than a legislative recognition of the principle
that a police jury is a creature of the state and possesses only
those powers conferred by the state's constitution and sta-
tutes. . ..6
In reference to the delegation doctrine, this court stated in
State v. Jordan,:6'
Parishes and municipal corporations of this state are vested
with no powers, and possess no authority, except such'as
are conferred upon, or delegated to, them by the Consti-
tution and statutes.
Thus, unless the legislature vested the police jury with
authority to act, it would be powerless to act.1 62
In essence, the supreme court concluded that the state created the
police juries and can impose upon them statutory charges even through
the use of careless language.
In a brief concurrence, Justice Dennis found the Reed majority's
analysis of local governmental power deficient when he suggested:
Although the majority is undoubtedly correct in stating that
at the time of the enactment of La. R.S. 16:6 most local
governments were "creatures of the state" and therefore needed
legislative authority to perform certain functions, it must be kept
in mind that under the 1974 Louisiana Constitution a home rule
charter government possesses, in affairs of local concern, powers
which within its jurisdiction are as broad as that of the state,
except when limited by the constitution, laws permitted by the
constitution or its own home rule charter. 63
At least insofar as the Reed opinion affects the 15 home rule charter
parishes, Justice Dennis' caveat appears well taken.
160. Id., citing La. Const. Art. VI, § 7(A); Rollins Envtl. Serv. v. lberville Parish,
371 So. 2d 1127, 1131 (La. 1979).
161. 207 La. 78, 84, 20 So. 2d 543, 545 (1944).
162. 518 So. 2d 1044, 1046 (La. 1988).
163. Id. at 1049 (citing Francis v. Morial, 455 So. 2d 1168, 1171 (La. 1984)); City
of New Orleans v. State, 426 So. 2d 1318, 1322 (La. 1983).
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B. Legislative Pattern of Shifting the Burden of a District
Attorney's Expenses to the Parish
The legislative history of Louisiana Revised Statutes 16:6 illustrates
graphically a progressive shifting of the burden of financing the district
attorney's operating expenses from the state legislature to the parish
governing authorities. Before 1959, the legislature bore the primary
responsibility for funding the district attorney's office and Louisiana
Revised Statutes 16:6 provided for a specific mandatory amount to be
paid by the state for the district attorney's expenses. 64 In 1959, the
legislature amended Louisiana Revised Statutes 16:6 to "authorize" the
parish police juries "to supplement and pay from their general fund"
district attorney's expenses exceeding the state funded expense allowance,
which was then up to $5,000.00.161
The camel's nose was now in the tent. In 1973 the legislature absolved
the state from any responsibility for the district attorney's expenses while
leaving the district attorney's mandatory power to compel payment of
his expenses intact.'" Taken together with the 1959 "authorization" of
the police jury to pay the district attorney's office expenses, the legis-
lature's abdication left only parish governing bodies to bear the burden
of paying for the district attorney's operation.
Logically, this historical development supported the supreme court's
holding in Reed that "when the state legislature abandoned its fiscal
responsibility, it intended to place the entire burden for funding the
16:6 expense on the police jury."' 67
Having dealt with the semantic problems inherent in the phraseology
of Louisiana Revised Statutes 16:6 and with the historical development
of the statute, the Reed court next turned its attention to a thornier
problem: was the parish general fund supplanted as the primary source
of funding for the district attorney's office expenses by the statutes
creating special funds that the district attorney could use for that pur-
pose.
C. Additional Sources of Funding the District Attorney's Office
The Washington Parish Police Jury raised a troublesome issue in
Reed when it claimed that the legislature evidenced a desire to transfer
the burden of funding the district attorney's office to funds other than
164. In 1938 the amount was up to $1,200.00. 1938 La. Acts No. 20, §§ 1, 2. In
1948 the amount was increased to $2,500.00. 1948 La. Acts No. 488, § 2. In 1959, the
legislature increased the expense allowance payable by the state to $5,000.00. 1959 La.
Acts No. 113, § 17.
165. 1959. La. Acts No. 113, § 17.
166. 1973 La. Acts No. 115, § 1.
167. 518 So. 2d 1044, 1047 (La. 1988).
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the parish general fund by statutorily creating numerous special funds
that could be used by the district attorney to pay his expenses.
While Reed's mandamus suit was pending he had paid the Louisiana
Revised Statutes 16:6 expenses from three other sources: the criminal
court fund, the district attorney's six percent and special funds, and
the district attorney's fee fund. 168
Reed claimed that the police jury was constitutionally compelled to
fund the district attorney's office because the district attorney exercises
state police power, which cannot be abridged by local government. 6 9
The supreme court deferred a ruling on this claim because it decided
that the police jury was statutorily required to fund the district attorney's
office under Louisiana Revised Statutes 16:6, but it could not avoid
ruling on the police jury's contention that the special funds Reed had
used should be the primary source rather than a secondary source of
the district attorney's funding.
The supreme court once again harkened back to basic rules of
statutory construction by observing that it must construe Louisiana
Revised Statutes 16:6 and all other laws providing funding for the district
attorney in pari materia to seek overall harmony of the funding pro-
visions with each other.'70
Provisions that the court had to harmonize were:
(1) The "Criminal Court Fund" (CCF) created by Louisiana
Revised Statutes 15:571.11 made up of fines and forfeitures
collected by the district courts for violations of state law or
parish ordinances, 7 ' which can be used to pay the district at-
torney's office expenses; 72
(2) The "Twelve Percent Fund" of the district -attorney
established by Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:571.11 (A) (2) out
of fines and forfeitures paid for violations of municipal ordi-
nances;"'3
(3) The fees collected by the district attorney for prosecuting
worthless check cases, which were allocated to defray the district
168. Established by La. R.S. 16:15 (1982 and Supp. 1990).
169. La. Const. Art. VI, § 9.
170. 518 So. 2d at 1047.
171. Criminal court fund (CCF) monies can be used by district attorneys, district
judges, and sheriffs to defray a variety of criminal court expenses. La. R.S. 15:571.11
(A)(l)(a), (b) (1981 and Supp. 1990).
172. With the concurrence of the district judge, the district attorney can use CCF
revenues to pay his office expenses including those payable by the parish under La. R.S.
16:6 (1982). 518 So. 2d 1044, 1048 (La. 1988).
173. Originally the district attorney received six percent of this fund, but 1977 La.
Acts No. 591, § 2, increased the amount remitted to the district attorney to twelve percent.
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attorney's office expenses by Louisiana Revised Statutes 16:15;
and174
(4) The special account added by the legislature in 1986 to
Louisiana Revised Statutes 16:16 composed of $10.00 court costs
imposed against every criminal defendant who is convicted after
trial, pleads guilty, or forfeits a bond.1 75
The police jury in Reed could logically argue that expense allocations
to the district attorney from the criminal court fund should be offset
against the police jury's obligation to pay the district attorney's expenses
from the parish general fund under Louisiana Revised Statutes 16:6
because one-half of any surplus remaining in the CCF at the end of
the year goes automatically into the parish general fund. 76 Thus, payment
of the district attorney's expenses either pursuant to the Louisiana Re-
vised Statutes 16:6 mandate (where payment was directly from the general
fund) or out of the criminal court fund (where payment reduced any
surplus going into the general fund) resulted in a diminution of the
parish general fund.
However, the supreme court spurned this line of argument. Instead,
the Reed court decided that the legislature could not have intended an
office with such an important constitutional function as the district
attorney to depend on fluctuating and uncertain sources of revenue such
as the CCF for funding. 77 Consequently, the supreme court deemed the
CCF, the twelve percent fund, the worthless check fees fund, and the
$10.00 court cost fund "to be nothing more than a recognition by the
legislature of the increased costs of operating the district attorney's
office.' '17 s Rather than supplanting Louisiana Revised Statutes 16:6 as
the primary source of funding for the district attorney's expenses, the
Reed court said these alternative funds were designed to supplement
general fund revenues payable under Louisiana Revised Statutes 16:6.
Failure of the litigants in Reed to engage in "cooperative intergovern-
mental relations" to reconcile their differences over the proper role to
be played by each statutory source of funding in paying the district
attorney's office expenses created a problem, the court noted, that
addresses itself to the legislature or to the political arena for resolution. 79
Thus, the supreme court neatly sidestepped the political thicket
inherent in resolving the police jury's claim that the availability of
alternate funding sources should be a factor in assessing the responsibility
174. 1983 La. Acts No. 196, § 1; 1986 La. Acts No. 74, § 1.
175. 1986 La. Acts No. 293, § 1.
176. La. R.S. 15:571.11(C)(1) (1981 and Supp. 1990).
177. 518 So. 2d 1044, 1048 (La. 1988).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1049.
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to fund the expenses of the district attorney. However, the court did
not shrink from the task of providing the police juries with some means
of imposing a finite limit upon the potentially infinite demands of the
state's district attorneys. The court did so by .saying:
We hold ... that the police jury's duty to fund the 16:6
expenses is limited by the standard of reasonableness. This lim-
itation comports with traditional interpretations of the doctrine
of inherent powers afforded the judicial branch of government
and satisfies the system of checks and balances underpinning a
republican form of government with its separation of powers.
Accordingly, the budget request of the district attorney must be
legitimate'in that it is related to the function of his office. Also
it must be quantitatively reasonable. 80
The court went on to affirm the district court's finding that district
attorney Reed's funding request was reasonable.
So, at last the Reed court has given the parish government what
they have not heretofore enjoyed-some legal basis for opposing un-
reasonable budget requests for statutorily mandated expenses. Reduction
of unreasonable requests for mandated expenses by parish officials may
be opposed either on the grounds that the expenses are: (a) not legit-
imately related to the function of the requesting official's office, or (b)
unreasonable in amount. Either ground presupposes the propriety of an
inquiry into the factual basis of the budget request and the exercise of
some discretion by the parish governing authority.
Requests for new carpets and office furniture may be unreasonable
in a fiscal climate in which parish governments are hard-pressed to feed
prisoners in the parish jail. A clerk of court's request for a new computer
system may be unreasonable if the present computer system is adequately
handling the volume of litigation in the parish. A judge's grant of a
twenty percent salary increase to his court reporter may be unreasonable
if court reporters in similar judicial districts, or within his own judicial
district, are paid far less. 8' Doubtless the determination of what is a
reasonable request for statutorily mandated expenses will be made by
triers of fact on a case by case basis. It is safe to predict that parish
governing authorities will regularly subject budget requests of. parish
officials to close scrutiny to determine whether or not they pass muster
under the dual test of reasonableness enunciated in Reed.
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. Under La. R.S. 13:961(E) (1983), judges can set their court reporters' salaries
without approval of or consultation with the parish governing body who must pay the
salary set by the judge out of the parish general fund.
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In Post v. Madison Parish Police Jury,1 2 the second circuit court
of appeal, inter alia, sustained the police jury's exception of prematurity
to the clerk of court's suit for a writ of mandamus seeking to order
the police jury to pay for a computer for his office. The court found
the clerk had not made a specific budget request for a new computer
"with specific prices" to the police jury. Absent a specific proposal the
police jury obviously could not determine the reasonableness of the
request as it is entitled to do under Reed.
The Post court also held that the trial court had improperly issued
a mandamus awarding deputy clerks $20.00 a day for court attendance
rather than the statutory minimum of $8.00 a day which the police jury
could choose under Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:846A(2). The court
of appeal said: "Mandamus awarding a certain amount of money is
inappropriate when the governing body by statute has discretion to pay
an amount within a specified range." '183
Connick v. City of New Orleans'" held that Reed v. Wasington
Parish is inapplicable to the District Attorney of Orleans Parish because
Louisiana Revised Statutes 16:6 which Reed interpreted applies to "[t]he
District Attorneys of this State, the Parish of Orleans excepted .. .
VII. WHOSE MANDATED EXPENSES ARE PAD FIrST?
Suppose that all budget requests by parish officials are reasonable
and yet the sum of these requests still exceed the resources of the parish
fisc. As our inquiry continues, we encounter that grim prospect and
undertake to suggest some possible answers.
A. Concursus as a Means of Coping with the Mandated Expenses
Dilemma-The Tangipahoa Parish Experience
On July 19, 1988, the Tangipahoa Parish Council filed a petition
for concursus making defendants the parish sheriff, assessor, coroner,
constables, justices of the peace, registrar of voters, clerk of court, as
well as the judges of the twenty-first judicial district and their court
reporters." 5 Pursuant to the concursus, the general fund revenues of
the parish, excluding dedicated funds, were deposited into the registry
of the court, and all defendants were ordered to assert their claims
contradictorily against the fund. The State of Louisiana intervened in
182. 554 So. 2d 198, 200 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
183. Id. at 201.
184. 543 So. 2d 66 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
185. Tangipahoa Parish Council v. Joseph E. Anzalone, Jr., No. 87-115, La. 21st
J.D.C. (Jan. 18, 1989).
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the concursus proceeding to assert its right to repayment of money the
state loaned to Tangipahoa Parish to build a jail.8 6
On August 16, 1988, the district attorney of the twenty-first judicial
district filed for reimbursement for employee life and health insurance
premiums, workmen's compensation insurance premiums, and telephone
expenses previously paid by the district attorney from his statutory special
expense funds on the grounds that Louisiana Revised Statutes 16:6 and
Reed v. Washington Parish Police Jury8" required payment of these
items from the parish general fund.' 8
On September 9, 1988, the Tangipahoa Parish Council obtained an
order to pay the telephone bills, inter alia, of the clerk of court, the
sheriff's office, and the tax assessor's office. 8 9
Again on September 29, 1988, the Tangipahoa Parish Council, the
parish president, the sheriff, and the coroner petitioned the court for
authority to pay various charges against the general fund that are il-
lustrative of the minute expenses that the parish governments finance
for other independent constitutional officers over whom the parish gov-
ernment enjoys little or no budgetary control. Included in the expenses
were postage stamps, phone bills, employee salaries, state and federal
employee withholding taxes, a judge's retirement payments, employer's
unemployment contributions, and utilities for the jail.
Some items designated as "flow-through expenses" are funded in
part by revenues deposited into the parish general fund by individuals,
other parish agencies, or state agencies. The expenses are then paid out
of the general fund for such items as contributions to the Louisiana
Parochial Employees retirement system or contributions to local fire
departments from proceeds of the state tax on fire insurance premiums.19°
After all Tangipahoa Parish general funds for 1988 were disbursed
pursuant to various orders issued by a judge ad hoc, who heard the
claims of the competing parties in open court, the judge dismissed the
concursus proceeding on January 18, 1989.' 9'
Given the desperate financial circumstances of most Louisiana parish
governments, it may safely be asserted that the Tangipahoa Parish
186. Id.
187. 518 So. 2d 1044 (La. 1988).
188. Tangipahoa Parish Council v. Joseph E. Anzalone, Jr., No. 87-115, La. 21st
J.D.C. (Jan. 18, 1989).
189. Id.
190. Id. See La. R.S. 22:1583 (1978 and Supp. 1990), which levies a 2% tax on fire
insurance premiums, the proceeds of which are then sent to the parish government for
distribution to the various fire departments in each parish pursuant to La. R.S. 22:1585
(1978 and Supp. 1990).
191. Order of Judge Lewis Doherty, Judge Ad Hoc, Tangipahoa Parish Council v.
Joseph E. Anzalone, Jr., No. 87-115, La. 21st J.D.C. (Jan. 18, 1989).
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concursus proceeding is a harbinger of things to come across the State
of Louisiana. More and more parish governments finding themselves
impaled on the horns of an unsolvable financial dilemma will eschew
refereeing the clash for funds among warring parish fiefdoms and simply
deposit the whole mess in the lap of the judiciary to sort out the priority
of competing claims to the parish general fund. Because local judges
will be urging their own claims to statutorily mandated expenses from
the general fund, ad hoc judges from outside the involved judicial district
will necessarily be called upon to determine whose claims take priority.
Use of the concursus device by beleaguered parish governments will
prevent the courts from deftly sidestepping, as they have done so far,
the critical issue in the whole mandated expense imbroglio: how will
the competing claims of the various mandated expense recipients be
reconciled when the total amount of the mandated expense claims exceeds
the parish general fund revenues.
B. Ranking of Competing Mandated Expense Claims When Claims
Exceed General Fund Revenues
Four possible approaches to reconciling the conflicting mandated
expense claims appear to be:
(1) Reduce all claims dollar for dollar on a pro-rata basis. This
approach would require an initial finding that each budgetary
request is reasonable under the Reed v. Washington Parish stan-
dard, but it has the considerable virtue of simplicity.
(2) Distinguish among the competing claimants by giving priority
to claims of constitutional officers over statutory officers. This
approach does not help much because most of the claimants
hold constitutionally created positions.
(3) Distinguish claims on the basis of the verbiage used in the
particular statute granting each claimant mandated expenses.
Some statutes specify a specific dollar amount to be paid, for
example, $9,500.00 per annum to the district attorney of the
twenty-first judicial district,1 92 while other statutes specify only
a general category of expenses that "shall be" paid by the parish
governments, for example, for "all necessary office furniture,
equipment, and record books" requested by the clerk of court. 93
One could plausibly argue that the specific amounts set by statute
should be paid before general categories of mandated expenses,
the reasonableness of which is subject to scrutiny under Reed.
192. La. R.S. 16:451 (1982).
193. La. R.S. 13:784 (1983 and Supp. 1990).
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Moreover, salaries of most public officials may not be reduced
during their term of office. 94
(4) Finally, the courts may choose to distinguish expenses that
are a sine qua non of parish government and cannot be financed
other than by general fund revenues or new taxes, for example,
providing a courthouse building, from those that can presently
be financed by using available alternative means (such as in-
creased "user fees" to be charged by the clerk of court) or
alternative statutory funds provided to the officer claiming man-
dated expenses (such as the statutory judicial expense funds
available to the district judges, 195 or the district attorney's stat-
utory twelve per cent fund). 96 The court could then give a
preferential claim against the general fund to those expenses
that cannot be paid from any other existing alternative revenue
source other than additional taxes. It must be noted that the
Louisiana Supreme Court has rejected such an approach when
Washington Parish proposed that the district attorney's office
expenses be paid first out of the criminal court fund 97 and the
residual twelve percent fund before resorting to the parish general
fund. While recognizing the district attorney's need for the crim-
inal court fund and the twelve percent fund to meet the increased
cost of operating the district attorney's office, the supreme court
said: "These additional funds were never intended to wrest the
primary responsibility for funding the 16:6 expenses from the
shoulders of the legislative, branch of government. "19
At this juncture, the most feasible method of reconciling mandated
expense claims that exceed the parish general fund would combine ap-
proaches one and three. Thus, it is suggested that each mandated expense
claim should be reduced proportionately so as to pare enough from
each claim to permit all mandated expenses to be paid out of the parish
general fund. However, all amounts specified by statute within each
category should be paid before any item described generally is paid.
For example, the portion of the district attorney's salary required by
statute to be paid by the parish must be paid before the district attorney's
office supplies are provided.
194. See, e.g., La. Const. art. V, § 31, which provides: "The salary and retirement
benefits of a . . , district attorney, sheriff, coroner, or clerk of the district court shall
not be diminished during his term of office."
195. La. R.S. 13:996-996.30 (1983 and Supp. 1990).
196. La. R.S. 15:571.11 (A)(b)(2)(a) (1988 and Supp. 1990).
197. La. R.S. 15:571.11 (1981 and Supp. 1990).
198. 518 So. 2d 1044, 1048-49 (La. 1988).
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VIII. DOES THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION REQUIRE STATE FUNDING
FOR ALL OPERATING COSTS OF THE DISTRICT COURTS?
A. Twenty-First Judicial District Court Claims A Constitutional
Right to be Funded by the State
The concursus proceeding filed by the Tangipahoa Parish Council
created a situation in which district judges of Louisiana's twenty-first
judicial district had to recuse themselves and lodge a claim against the
parish general fund which was deposited in the registry of their own
court to obtain the funds necessary to operate their courts in 1988.
Necessarily this placed the judges in competition for funds against other
parish officers and agencies. Seeking to escape this unseemly role in
fiscal year 1989, the judges of the twenty-first judicial district filed a
lawsuit seeking to establish their constitutional right to have all court
expenses paid by direct appropriation from the state treasury. 99 No
discussion of mandated expenses would be complete without an exam-
ination of the constitutional arguments raised by the judges in support
of their position.
B. Failure to Fund District Courts is a Denial of Rightful Status of
Judiciary as a Co-Equal Branch of State Government
The judges of the twenty-first judicial district sued the State of
Louisiana qua state, Governor "Buddy" Roemer, the Speaker of the
House, the President of the Senate, and the Members of the Tangipahoa
Parish Council. The gravamen of their suit was that the district court
judiciary was being denied its rightful status as a co-equal branch of
government under the tripartite system of government established by the
Louisiana Constitution. Of course, the Louisiana Constitution adheres
to the model of the national government created by the United States
Constitution in establishing three separate and distinct branches of gov-
ernment: legislative, executive, and judicial.
1. State Funding Presently Provided for District Court Judges'
Salaries
The State of Louisiana pays the salaries of all 156 district judges
now serving in Louisiana pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:691.
Nevertheless, the aggrieved judges of the twenty-first judicial district
decry the current practice whereby the state budget provides funds for
the entire operations of the legislative and executive branches of state
199. Twenty-First Judicial District Court v. State, No. 890-1369, La. 21st J.D.C. (Sept.
8, 1989).
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government by direct appropriation, but provides no funds for the
operations of most of the district courts of the state, thereby relegating
judges of those courts to seeking operating funds from the parish general
fund. Cursory examination of state appropriation acts for 1988 and
1989 bears out the truth of this thesis.
For instance, 1988 Louisiana Acts No. 348 appropriated funds for
"the expense of operation and maintenance" of the Louisiana Supreme
Court and the five circuit courts of appeal, but not for operation and
maintenance of any district courts except for the judges travel expenses2°°
and office expenses up to $5,000.00 per annum. 201
In a situation all too typical of the morass of uncoordinated statutes
that involve financing government at the parish level in Louisiana, there
is no comprehensive statute establishing a uniform coherent system for
financing district court operations. Instead, the Judicial Appropriations
Act contains the usual anomalous "special" provisions providing ad hoc
financing for a few fortunate district court officers while denying state
financing to the overwhelming number of district court functionaries
similarly situated across the state. 20 2 Thus, Act 348 made special state
appropriations for the following: expenses and a commissioner for the
Orleans Parish Civil District Court and for office expenses, thirteen
minute clerks, twenty-two court reporters, four commissioners, eight law
clerks, a judicial administrator, and six assistants for the Orleans Parish
Criminal Court; two court reporters and a law clerk for the twentieth
judicial district; 203 office expenses and two commissioners of the nine-
teenth judicial district; 204 and a commissioner for the fifteenth judicial
200. La. R.S. 13:694 (1983 and Supp. 1990) provides that the "District Judges ...
shall be reimbursed actual traveling and hotel expenses incurred in the discharge of their
official duties." A Supreme Court Rule, in La. R.S. 13:694.1 (Supp. 1990), established
reimbursement of travel at 30 cents per mile up to $600.00 per annum.
201. La. R.S. 13:698 (1983) states that "[d]istrict judges . . . shall be reimbursed actual
expenses of the salaries of stenographers, clerks, law books, legal periodicals, stationery,
telephone, and like expenses incurred in the discharge of their duties. Such expenses shall
not exceed the sum of five thousand dollars for any judge in any one year." Such a
sum would not appear adequate to do much more than pay for one year's upkeep for
a judge's basic library.
202. Parenthetically, singling out a few judicial districts for state financing while
excluding all others is a blatant example of a classification with no rational basis; therefore,
a violation of the equal protection principle, which generally requires that all persons
similarly situated receive equal legal treatment. Such an arbitrary selection of favored
judicial districts to receive state largesse appears to violate the spirit, if not the letter of
Article III, section 12 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, prohibiting local and special
laws.
203. As provided by La. R.S. 13:966.1 (1983 and Supp. 1990).
204. As provided by La. R.S. 13:712 (1983 and Supp. 1990). The twentieth judicial
district is East Feliciana and West Feliciana Parishes. The nineteenth judicial district is
East Baton Rouge Parish.
[Vol. 50
PARISH POLICE JURY EXPENSES
district.2 5 Outside of the favored four districts, all other district criminal
and civil courts are left to fend for themselves in the local parish war
of all against all to obtain funding for court reporters, law clerks,
administrators, and the other panoply of functionaries required to run
the district courts.
The 1989 Judiciary Appropriation Act contained no improvement
for the district courts in the 57 parishes deprived of state financing for
their operations. 206 Ironically, the verbiage of the Judiciary Appropriation
Act renders ritualistic obeisance to the judiciary's status as a co-equal
branch of government by providing that allocations made therein shall
be paid by the State treasurer with "preference over all other warrants,
except warrants for the salaries of constitutional officers of the state
and warrants for expenses of the legislature, which shall be concurrent
with the warrant provided by this Act.'' 27 This language offers cold
comfort to the district court operating in one of the fifty-seven parishes
where the district courts receive no state appropriations for operations.
Even those four judicial districts that receive some state funding for
operations are receiving a mere pittance compared to their total operating
budget. For instance, while the state appropriated $91,798.00 for office
expenses for the judicial expense fund of the fifteenth judicial district,
the parish governments of the three parishes composing that judicial
district-Acadia, Vermilion, and Lafayette-contributed over
$1,000,000.00 from their parish general funds for operation of the
fifteenth judicial district courts in 1989.208
2. Melange of Parish Provisions For Paying Court Reporters
All district courts require minute clerks, bailiffs, and court reporters
to conduct business. Minute clerks are paid by the parish clerk of court,
who is reimbursed a daily court attendance fee by the parish.2 9 Bailiffs
are paid by the sheriff, who is paid a fee for daily court attendance
by his deputy out of the parish general fund.210
205. As provided by La. R.S. 13:715 (1983 and Supp. 1990). The fifteenth judicial
district is Acadia, Vermilion, and Lafayette Parishes.
206. 1989 La. Acts No. 551.
207. 1989 La. Acts No. 551, § 1(c).
208. A letter from Michael Bertrand, Secretary Treasurer of Vermilion Parish Police
Jury, on November 8, 1989, provided that $711,157.00 was paid from the general fund
for judiciary expenses, including the district attorney's office and the coroner. Joseph C.
Arabie, Secretary-Treasurer of Acadia Parish Police Jury, said $254,129.00 was paid out
of the parish general fund towards district court operation for 1989 in a letter dated
October 31, 1989. In a letter dated October 31, 1989, Jim Barton, Secretary-Treasurer
of the Lafayette Parish Police Jury said the parish general fund contributed $129,894.00
toward court operation.
209. La. R.S. 13:846(A) (1983 and Supp. 1990).
210. La. R.S. 33:1430 (1988 and Supp. 1990).
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I Court reporters, on the other hand, are directly paid by the parish.
A veritable melange of methods are used to pay them. In 1986, the
Judicial Council conducted a survey of the forty-two district courts in
Louisiana to determine how court reporters were paid and what problems
were being encountered. The response was revealing.
There were 247 court reporters whose salaries ranged from $10,800.00
per year to $40,680.00 per year.21' These figures do not include the
money earned by court reporters for providing transcripts to litigants,
which is set by statute at $1.50 per page and twenty-five cents per copy
reported and transcribed. 212 Unfortunately, the parish general fund must
pay the transcript fees in all criminal cases in which the defendant is
a pauper and in all civil cases in which the appellant is a pauper. 213
Of the forty-two Louisiana district courts, the Judicial Council's
1986 survey revealed that court reporters' salaries were paid in twenty
districts by the police jury; in nine by a combination of the police jury,
the. criminal court fund and/or the judicial expense fund; in four by
the criminal court fund and/or the judicial expense fund; and in nine
courts by some combination of the criminal court fund, the indigent
defender fund, the sheriff's department funds, the clerk of court's funds,
the State of Louisiana, the police jury, and a number of special funds
created by statutes that authorize civil filing fees to be used to pay
court reporter's salaries.214
Because almost all criminal defendants are indigent, financing prep-
aration of transcripts in indigent criminal cases is a substantial and
persistent statewide problem for district courts. In the forty-two district
courts in 1986, indigent transcripts were paid for from the criminal
court fund in eighteen, by the police jury in eight, by a combination
of the police jury and the criminal court fund in five, by the indigent
defender fund in one, by the indigent defender board and the district
attorney in one, by the police jury and the Louisiana Department of
Corrections in one. 215 In six -districts, court reporters were not paid for
indigent transcripts-an apparent violation of a statutory mandate that
they be paid. 216 Another district court provides for payment of indigent
criminal transcripts out of the criminal court fund and the indigent
211. Louisiana Judicial Council Survey on Funding of Court Reporters, June 1986,
at 1 [hereinafter Judicial Council].
212.' La. R.S. 13:961(F) (1983 and Supp. 1990).
213. La. Code Civ. P. art. 5181; La: R.S. 13:4529 (1968 and Supp. 1990); La. R.S.
15:304 (1981 and Supp. 1990).
214. Judicial Council, supra note 211, at 1.
215. Id. at'l-2.
216. Id.
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transcript fund, which is supported by a $14.00 cost assessed in each
non-indigent criminal case. 217
It is a small wonder that the income of court reporters varies so
wildly from one judicial district to another in Louisiana. Surely, a process
using such a hodgepodge of temporary expedients for financing the vital
function of making the only record of judicial proceedings that will be
considered on appeal is doomed to difficulty. In-the 1986 survey, out
of the forty-two district courts, nineteen reported that they were ex-
periencing serious problems- in paying court reporters salaries and/or
finding funds to pay for indigent criminal transcripts. 2 8
The melange of provisions governing payment for court reporters'
salaries and transcripts is not the result of vacillation by parish gov-
ernment. The state statutes imposing the duty to provide for these items
upon parish government simply do not say exactly how they are to do
it.
Each district judge appoints his own court reporter21 9 and fixes the
salary to be paid, 220 but the parish government must pay the salary.
Thus, the police jury does not enjoy any power to examine the rea-
so'nableness of the salary set by the judge. In setting such salaries, the
district judge is really performing a legislative function. By contrast, at
the appellate level, the total amount of money available for salaries for
court personnel is set by the legislature via the approval or modification
of the judicial budget request.
However, if the district judges desire to appoint additional court
reporters, in excess of one per judge, the appointment of such reporters
can only be made "with the approval of each police jury."' 22' But there
are statutes providing directly for appointment of additional reporters
in specified judicial districts that appear to annul the parish government's
veto power over such appointments provided by. Louisiana Revised Sta-
tutes 13:961(A). 222
Before a civil transcript is filed by the court reporter in non-pauper
cases, the appellant must file a deposit for the costs. 223 In pauper cases,
-217. Id. The final district court (Orleans Parish Civil District Court) has no indigent
criminal transcripts.
218. Id.
219. La. R.S. 13:961(A) (1983).
220. La. R.S. 13:961(E),(1983) says each court reporter "shall receive a monthly salary
to be fixed and determined by the judge making the appointment."
221. La. R.S. 13:961(A) (1983).
222. See, e.g., La. R.S. 13:971(A) (1983) which says: "In addition to the Court
Reporters appointed under . . . R.S. 13:961(A) the judges of the Sixteenth Judicial District
shall appoint one additional court reporter and each of the judges of the Twenty-Seventh
Judicial District may appoint one additional court reporter."
223. La. R.S. 13:961(F)(3)(a)(ii) (1983 and Supp. 1990); La. Code Civ. P. art. 2126
(1961 and Supp. 1990).
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court reporter's fees are assessed as costs to be paid by the party or
parties ultimately cast in judgment.2 24
Criminal transcripts in pauper cases, however, cost 22 district courts
in 1986 a total of $391,000.00 in court reporters fees. 22 Payment of
these fees is addressed elliptically in a number of statutes that do not
together establish a coherent methodology of dealing with them.
The court reporter statute says:
In indigent criminal cases, the fees shall be paid primarily from
the criminal court fund, the indigent defender fund or as oth-
erwise provided by law upon approval of the judge and shall
be assessed as costs. 226
The indigent criminal appellant is unquestionably entitled to a "free"
transcript of the proceedings against him for appellate review of his
conviction. 227 The criminal procedure statutes provide generally that "all
expenses whatever attending criminal proceedings shall be paid by the
respective parishes in which the offense charged may have been com-
mitted . . . by the parish treasurer. ' 221 Unfortunately, the statutes do
not tell the parish treasurer from what source the money is to come.
The indigent defender fund, formed by a specified portion of court
costs for misdemeanor and felony convictions, may be used as a source. 229
The criminal court fund composed of fines and forfeitures imposed by
district 'courts and district attorney's conviction fees in criminal cases
involving violations of state or parish ordinances "may be used" as
well. 230 But inevitably, these funds have proven insufficient to provide
for the indigent criminal defendant's transcripts because the funds are
used for so many other expenses of criminal prosecutions.
Insight into the view of a working district judge who must deal
with issues of payments of the court reporter and providing indigent
criminal defendants with a transcript on a daily basis was provided by
twenty-seventh judicial district Judge Isom J. Guillory, Jr., when he
spoke before the Judicial Council on April 11, 1986, and recommended
state funding of these items as the real solution to the problem because:
1. It will standardize salaries (as it did in the case of the judges).
2. It will give us a responsible fund source for payment of
reporters.
224. La. R.S. 13:961(F)(3)(b)(ii) (1983 and Supp. 1990); La. Code Civ. P. arts. 5186,
5187, 5188 (1961 and Supp. 1989).
225. Judicial Council, supra note 211, at 2.
226. La. R.S. 13:961(F)(4)(b) (1983 and Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
227. La. R.S. 13:4529 (1968 and Supp. 1990); State v. Johnson, 261 La. 620, 260
So. 2d 645, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1085, 93 S. Ct. 691 (1972).
228. La. R.S. 15:304 (1981 and Supp. 1990).
229. La. R.S. 15:145(E) (1981 and Supp. 1990).
230. La. R.S. 15:571.11(A)(1)(a) (1981 and Supp. 1990).
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3. It will restore the standing and dignity of state officers, and
not expose them to public confrontations with elected officials-
which demeans the office and creates unnecessary problems for
heavily occupied judges. 23
Thus, a district judge of long experience concluded in 1986 that the
recurrent financial impasses confronting the district court judiciary under
the system of parish financing actually impinges upon their effectiveness
in coping with heavy case dockets-which is one of the salient points
in the Tangipahoa judges' suit in 1989.
3. Failure to Finance the District Judiciary in the State Budget
Impinges on The Judiciary's Role as Check and Balance on
Arbitrary Abuse of Governmental Power by the Legislative
and Executive Branches
Obviously, if the judiciary's status as a co-equal branch of govern-
ment is diminished by failure of the state to fund its operations at the
district court level, the independence of the judiciary-so sacrosanct and
necessary an ingredient of American constitutional government-is se-
riously eroded.
The Louisiana Constitution enshrines district courts and grants them
original trial jurisdiction over the most important matters considered in
both private and public law. Specifically, article V, section 16 says:
A district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
and criminal matters. It shall have exclusive original jurisdiction
of felony cases and of cases involving title to immovable prop-
erty; the right to office or other public position; civil or political
rights; probate and succession matters; the state, a political
corporation, or political subdivisions, or a succession, as a de-
fendant; and the appointment of receivers or liquidators for
corporations or partnerships.
Thus, failure to finance district courts weakens the whole foundation
upon which the edifice of the Louisiana judiciary system of trial and
appellate courts rests.
Whence goeth the constitutional system of checks and balances in
such a situation? Only a vigorous independent judiciary, immune from
the political pressures inherent in the present process of judicial funding
via the battle for sparse parish funds, can be safely relied upon to
forestall arbitrary or unconstitutional actions by the legislative and ex-
231. Judge Isom J. Guillory, Jr., Transcript of Presentation of Funding of Court
Reporters before the Louisiana Judicial Counsel, April 11, 1986, at 8. The writer wishes
to thank Judge Guillory for his assistance and his ideas.
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ecutive branches of state government, or by the legislative or executive
arms of local governments.
4. Lack of State Funding Could Deny Access to District Courts
and Destroy the Judiciary's Role as Guarantor of Individual
Rights of the Citizenry
Given the dire state of parish government finance, the specter of
district courts unable to operate because of a dearth of operating funds
is more than a theoretical fear. No one was in a better position to
realize this fact than the district judges in Tangipahoa Parish. Therefore,
one of the primary theoretical bases of the suit brought by the twenty-
first judicial district judges against the state was the claim that failure
of the State to fund operation of the district courts denies the people
the access to the courts23 2 necessary to preserve "inviolate" '233 the people's
rights to due process of law234 and equal protection of the laws235nall
as guaranteed by the Louisiana Constitution.23 6 Certainly, one may plau-
sibly argue that failure to fund local courts eviscerates all constitutional
guarantees because a mere textual recognition of rights without providing
a local judicial forum for enforcement is a meaningless play on words.
5. Reliance on Parish Government to Finance the District Courts
is an Unconstitutional Delegation of Legislative Power
The Local Government Article of the Louisiana Constitution allows
parishes to establish home rule forms of government that may exercise
"any power" and perform "any function necessary, requisite, or proper
for the management of its affairs, not denied by general law or incon-
sistent with this constitution.1 237
Despite the unprecedented broad sweep of this grant of residual
governmental power to local government by our state constitution, the
framers of the 1974 constitution took special pains to protect the in-
dependent judiciary from any undue influence by local government.
Consequently, the Local Government Article says:
232. La. Const. art. I, § 22 guarantees that "All Courts shall be open, and every
person shall have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice, administered
without denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in his person, property,
reputation, or other rights."
233. La. Const. art. I, § I:
234. Id. at § 2.
235. Id. at § 3.
236. This theory is advanced succinctly in paragraphs 6-9 of the twenty-first judicial
district judges' complaint.
237. La. Const. art. VI, § 1.
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Notwithstanding any provisions of this Article, courts and their
officers may be established or affected only as provided in Article
V of this Constitution. 238
Yet, as the Tangipahoa judges point out under the existing statutes
enacted by the legislature and approved by the governor, parish gov-
ernments have been granted virtually plenary power over the district
courts. Parish governments no longer pay any portion of the district
judge's salaries, as they did prior to 1975,239 or any portion of the
district judge's retirement benefits, as they did prior to 1976.240 However,
the Louisiana statutes delegate to parish governments all responsibility
for providing funds necessary to house and operate the district courts.
Parish government must provide a suitable building and furniture
for the district court and "necessary heat and illumination therefor. ' 241
The ancient case of Watts v. Police Jury of Carro/242 recognized in 1856
the right of a citizen to compel the parish governing body to levy a
general alimony tax and to appropriate money to build a courthouse
so that he would not have to travel outside of the parish to obtain
access to a district court. However, the court in Watts faced the happy
prospect of a police jury that possessed unused constitutional authority
to levy a millage for general parish operations, a circumstance that does
not currently prevail in a single Louisiana parish. What would be the
fate of a litigant, whether judge or ordinary citizen, seeking to compel
238. Emphasis added.
239. Prior to 1975, most parishes supplemented the state pay of their district judges.
1975 La. Acts No. 743 amended La. R.S. 13:691 to provide in subsection (C) that "No
judge ... directly or indirectly, any additional salary, compensation, emolument, or benefit
from the state or any of its political subdivisions except (1) retirement benefits, (2)
reimbursement of those expenses provided for ... by La. R.S. 13:694, 13:698, and
13:1341.2, (3) membership in group insurance programs, and (4) educational grants."
(emphasis added).
240. State ex rel. Guste v. City of New Orleans, 363 So. 2d 678 (La. 1978), struck
down a New Orleans city ordinance which permitted Orleans Parish judges to receive
from the city an annual sum equal to one half of their annual contribution to the State
Employee's Retirement System because it violated the prohibition against local government
stipends to district judges contained in La. R.S. 13:691(c) (1983). In so doing, the supreme
court rendered this historical perspective:
Because the judicial retirement was not an actuarially funded system, and because
judges did not make contributions to the system as did other state employees,
the constitution of 1974 directed the legislature to provide for a retirement
system for judges. It was not until 1976 (R.S. 13:12 et seq.) that the legislature
provided that the judges. could be members in and contribute to the state
employees retirement system.
363 So. 2d at 683-84.
241. La. R.S. 33:4713 (1987). La. R.S. 33:4715 (1988) also provides, "The police jury
of each parish shall provide a good and sufficient courthouse, with rooms for jurors ....
242. 11 La. Ann. 141 (1856).
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construction of "suitable" courtrooms today? At best, outcome of such
a mandamus proceeding appears problematical if we consider that the
parish government would doubtless defend against such a claim by
initiating a concursus and depositing the parish general fund into the
registry of the court. At that point, parish litigants advancing the stat-
utory claim of their right to a suitable district court building would
doubtless be joined by sheriff-claimants asserting their statutorily man-
dated claims for "a good and sufficient jail ' 243 and by all the other
mandated expense claimants. Suffice it to say that forcing parish gov-
ernments to build new parish courtrooms, even though actually needed,
will be difficult at best.
What of the court personnel whose presence is the sine qua non of
an operating district court? Statutes impose upon parish government the
obligation to pay the salaries of official court reporters, 2" and the court's
"stenographic, secretarial, and other personnel necessary to make the
functions of the court effective. 245
Petit jurors,2 46 grand jurors,2 7 and witnesses2" in all criminal cases
are summoned and, if necessary, fed and housed24 at the expense of
the parish government. Even in civil cases brought in forma pauperis,
the parish must pay the cost of summoning jurors250 and witnesses. 25'
Parish government must also pay witnesses and court fees in juvenile
cases .252
Sheriffs or their deputies are entitled to a fee for daily district court
attendance paid by the parish government. 253 The clerk of court or his
243. La. R.S. 33:4715 (1988).
244. La. R.S. 13:1587 (1983).
245. Id.
246. La. R.S. 13:409(B) (1983) (repealed).
247. La. R.S. 13:409(C) (1983) (repealed).
248. La. R.S. 15:252-55 (1981) provide for parish government compensation to off-
duty law enforcement officers called as witnesses.
249. La. R.S. 15:304 (1981) provides that "the pay of witnesses, jurors, and all expenses
whatever attending criminal proceedings shall be paid by the respective parishes in which
the offense charged may have been committed." But see La. R.S. 15:571.11 (1981), which
permits payment from the parish criminal court fund, inter alia of "expenses and fees
of the petit jury and grand jury, for witness fees."
250. La. Code Civ. P. art. 5185(A)(3).
251. La. R.S. 13:3671 and 3661 (Supp. 1990) provide for witness fees in civil cases;
La. R.S. 13:3662 (Supp. 1990) provides witness fees for off duty law enforcement officers
in civil cases. La. Code Civ. P. art. 5185(A)(2) requires the parish to pay for compulsory
attendance of six witnesses or more if the trial court approves the litigants application
for an increase. In Hartford v. Mobley, 233 La. 956, 98 So. 2d 250 (1957), the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that in an in forma pauperis proceeding the police jury of the parish
in which the trial was held was required to advance payment of witnesses' fees and jurors'
per diem.
252. La. R.S. 13:1585 (1983 and Supp. 1990).
253. La. R.S. 33:1430 (1983) provides a fee of not less than $16.00 nor more than
$25.00 per day.
[Vol. 50
PARISH POLICE JURY EXPENSES
deputy must also be paid a daily court attendance fee by the parish. 25 4
There can be no district court trials without jurors, witnesses, bailiffs,
and minute clerks. Yet, it is not the state but the parish that provides
these parties essential to district court proceedings in Louisiana.
Trial courts must provide transcripts for appeals. Court reporter's
transcript fees in all criminal cases 255 and in all in forma pauperis civil
cases in which a pauper appeals25 6 must be paid for by the parish in
which a trial is held. Moreover, the parish governing body must provide
official court reporters with a suitable office, supplies, and equipment
for performing their tasks of reporting and transcribing notes of evi-
dence. 25 7
Except for salaries and retirement paid to the district judges out of
the state treasury, it is apparent that all other costs necessary to operate
the district courts had been delegated to the parish governments prior
to enactment of the various judicial expense funds under Part VI of
Title 13 of the Revised Statutes.
6. Various Judicial Expense Funds Created by the Revised
Statutes Fail to Meet the Need for State Funding of District
Court Operations
1969 Louisiana Acts No. 135 established a judicial expense fund for
the nineteenth judicial district under Part VII of Title 13 as Louisiana
Revised Statutes 13:991. 1975 Louisiana Acts No. 603 changed the title
of Part VI to "Judicial Expense Funds" heralding the creation of such
funds in twenty-nine other district courts. 28 The pattern for each of
these funds is similar. First, they provide for additional filing fees in
civil suits (ranging from $5.00 to $10.00) and additional costs in criminal
convictions, guilty pleas, or bond forfeitures (ranging from $5.00 to
$15.00) to create the judicial expense fund. Then they provide that the
judges of that district en banc control disbursement. Finally, they specify
that the funds may be spent for various operational expenses of the
district courts except judicial salaries.
At first blush the judicial expense fund statutes appear to provide
the kind of self-generating funding for the district courts that would
254. La. R.S. 13:846(A) (Supp. 1990) mandates a fee of at least $8.00 per day with
a maximum of $20.00 per day.
255. La. R.S. 13:964(F) (Supp. 1983) sets transcript fees for civil and criminal cases.
La. R.S. 15:291 (1981) provides for the rights of an accused in a criminal case to have
all testimony transcribed. La. R.S. 15:571.11 (1981 and Supp. 1990) and La. R.S.
13:961(F)(4)(b) (Supp. 1990) provides for payment of transcription for indigents out of
the parish criminal court fund. La. R.S. 13:4529 (1968) permits indigents to take appeals
without paying costs that the parish must pay pursuant to La. R.S. 15:304 (1981).
256. La. Code Civ. P. art. 5185(A)(1), (4) entitles a pauper to preparation of a record
and for devolutive appeal, but Article 5185(B) says the appeal cannot be suspensive.
257. La. R.S. 13:961(C) (1983 and Supp. 1990).
258. La. R.S. 13:994-996.51 (1983 and Supp. 1990).
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free them from the turmoil of budgetary squabbles currently endemic
to Louisiana parish governments. Unfortunately, the judicial expense
fund concept is fundamentally defective for five reasons:
(1) The judicial expense funds simply yield inadequate sums
of money when compared to the sums necessary for district
court operation.
(2) Paying for the judiciary solely through court costs tends
to reduce the district courts to collectors of fines, forfeitures,
and costs rather than dispensers of justice. The United State
Supreme Court has frowned upon those municipal courts in
which the Mayor, who was also a judge, received his salary as
executive solely or primarily from fines imposed while acting as
a traffic judge.2 9 Indeed, such courts have been held to effec-
tively deny due process of law. The same constitutional objection
could be raised to the quality of criminal justice dispensed by
district courts dependent solely upon fines and costs for their
operating funds.
(3) Financing district courts through fines and forfeitures
leaves the court's operations subject to the vagaries of criminal
law enforcement and traffic enforcement in their respective ju-
risdictions. Thus, a precipitous drop in the number of state
policemen assigned to an area could virtually shut down the
district court by decreasing traffic citations. At the least, revenues
from fines and forfeitures provide no reliable barometer for an
annual judicial budget because the income is variable while the
expenses remain constant.
(4) Areas with a large volume of criminal, traffic, and civil
proceedings will necessarily enjoy better financed district courts
than areas with low volumes of judicial business. Should areas
with a more law abiding citizenry suffer inadequate financing
of their courts as a reward for their probity?
(5) Financing district court operations solely through court
costs and fines results in inequities among the district courts
across the state similar to the inequities that existed in the salaries
of the district judges when wealthy parish governments paid
their district judges a much higher salary supplement than the
poorer parishes could afford.
Neither equal protection of the law nor a uniform statewide judicial
system are fostered by such a mode of financing the district courts.
259. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437 (1927) held that a mayor who had
a direct pecuniary interest in receiving costs for conviction of one violating a liquor law
was not a fair and impartial judge guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See also Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S. Ct. 80 (1972).
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C. The Judges of the Twenty-First Judicial District Lose in the
District Court
On September 8, 1989, the district court rendered reasons for judg-
ment denying the petitions for declaratory judgment and for mandamus
filed by the judges of the twenty-first judicial district.2 60 Because of the
pivotal nature of this case, close scrutiny of the court's reasons for
judgment is imperative.
The district court held that the twenty-first judicial district judges
were not entitled to the relief they sought for two reasons: (1) none of
the defendants had a ministerial duty to provide funds for the operation
of the district courts, and (2) the relief sought was "not needed at this
time and when needed can be obtained by following prescribed proce-
dures. "261
1. Can the Legislature be Compelled to Fund the Judicial
Offices Created by the State Constitution?
In denying the Tangipahoa judges' claim, the district court said:
"the Legislature has supreme sovereignty over the expenditure of State
funds [and] . .-. decides how the branches and department for govern-
ment shall be funded from the public fisc. "262
From this truism, the district court reasoned:
The application to the legislature for funds for the operation
of any department of government is made by budgetary requests
to the legislature. The budgetary requests are considered by the
Legislative Budget Committee, passed upon [by] the entire leg-
islature and finally, if approved, signed by the Governor. The
approval of any budgetary requests is discretionary and .. . is
not subject to the Mandamus powers of this Court.263
Such a conclusion is a non sequitur because the twenty-first judicial
district judges' suit does not challenge the legislature's hegemony over
budgetary appropriations per se, but properly challenges the legislature's
refusal to include in the budget any appropriations for operations of
an integral arm of the co-equal judiciary branch of government. If the
260. Judge Cleveland J. Marcel, Sr., reasons for judgment in Twenty-First Judicial
District Court v. State, No. 890-1369, La. 21st J.D.C. (Sept. 8, 1989).
261. Id. (suit roll 387, frame 1452).
262. The district court cites Woodward v. Reily, 244 La. 337, 152 So. 2d 41 (1963),
rev'd on other grounds, League of Women Voters v. New Orleans, 381 So. 2d 441 (La.
1980), and Segura v. Louisiana Architects Selection Bd., 353 So. 2d 330 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1977).
263. Twenty-First Judicial District Court v. State, No. 890-1369, La. 21st J.D.C. (Sept.
8, 1989) (suit roll 387, frame 1452).
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legislature decided not to appropriate any money for the governor's
staff or his office expenses although providing handsomely for the
remainder of the executive department, where would the governor seek
redress if not in the courts? If the governor were to veto all appro-
priations for the Louisiana courts of appeal, where would these con-
stitutionally enshrined judges seek redress if not in the courts?
Axiomatic in American constitutional theory is the principle that
the federal courts have the power to review the constitutional validity
of actions taken by coordinate branches of the national government 2"
and to nullify actions that violate the Constitution of the United States.
Louisiana constitutional law rests on the same premise . 6 The Louisiana
district courts are created directly by the state constitution, unlike United
States district courts, which are created by congressional act under the
federal constitutional scheme. A fortiori, the legislature's failure to pro-
vide funding for district courts in its legislative enactments is a prima
facie violation of the Louisiana Constitution. To argue otherwise leads
to this reductio ad absurdem: the legislature could refuse to fund the
supreme court and the courts of appeal by direct state appropriation
and they could not be legally compelled to do so.
The legislature exercises its power both actively by choosing to enact
enabling legislation and passively by refusing to enact such legislation.
Legislative enactments can unquestionably be abrogated if they violate
the state constitution. The legislature can be compelled to act in a cause
where the state constitution compels it to act and its failure to act
emasculates a coordinate branch of state government created directly by
the state constitution.
2. Does Present Law Provide the Means of Coping With the
Current Crises in District Court Funding?
In the Tangipahoa Parish case, the district court refused the request
for mandamus of the twenty-first judicial district court judges, inter
alia, because (a) the twenty-first district could present its needs to the
Judicial Budgetary Control Board; (b) the Tangipahoa Parish Council
is statutorily obligated to finance the district courts; and (c) the twenty-
264. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
265. In Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 23 S. Ct. 29 (1902) the Supreme Court ruled
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a state to
maintain a separation of powers, but La. Const. art. II, § 1 explicitly establishes three
separate branches of government. Section 2 provides that "no one of these branches ...
shall exercise power belonging to either of the others." Louisiana cases holding that the
courts have the power and duty to declare unconstitutional laws invalid include State v.
Gatlin, 241 La. 321, 129 So. 2d 4 (1961), overruled on other grounds by State v. Liggett,
363 So. 2d 1184 (La. 1978) and State v. Thompson, 366 So. 2d 1291 (La. 1978), and
State v. Birdsell, 235 La. 396, 104 So. 2d 148 (1958).
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first district had enough money in their judicial expense fund and in
the criminal court fund to operate their court in the immediate future.
266
Examination of each of these purported sources for district court funding
reveals that they are patently inadequate.
a. Judicial Budgetary Control Board
Section 38 of Title 24 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes establishes
the Legislative Budgetary Control Council, which is empowered to "di-
rect any budget unit of the state to submit information relative to the
financial requirements and receipts of the budget unit," including the
expenditures, services, equipment, personnel, or any other matter relating
to the operations "of the budget unit to the Joint Legislative Committee
on the Budget or to the Legislative Fiscal Office.1
2 67
The Louisiana Supreme Court Rules establish a Judicial Budgetary
Control Board, which is composed of thirteen members: the chief justice
of the supreme court; an associate justice designated by the chief justice
who serves as chairman; the chief judge of each of the five courts of
appeal or his designee; a district judge selected by the Louisiana District
Judge's Association; a judge of the criminal district court, Parish of
Orleans; two district judges and a judge of a separate juvenile or family
court, each appointed by the chief justice of the supreme court; and
the judicial administrator of the supreme court. 268
Among the duties assigned the Judicial Budgetary Control Board is
presentation to the Louisiana Supreme Court for its approval a unified
budget request for the judicial branch prior to each session of the
legislature. 269 The supreme court then presents the judiciary's unified
budget request to the legislature for enactment into law.
270
Historically, such budget requests have not included allocations for
operation and administration of the district court. Nothing less than a
revolution in the confection of the state judiciary budget would be
required to add such a large sum of money to the supreme court's
budget request. Annual cost of operation for all district courts, excluding
district judges' salaries, was approximately twenty to thirty million dollars
266. Twenty-First Judicial District Court v. State, No. 890-1369, La. 21st J.D.C. (Sept.
8, 1989) (suit roll 387, frames 1452-54).
267. La. R.S. 24:38 (1989). La. R.S. 39:45.1 (1989) specified the form in which budget
units are to submit their requests.
268. Rule 24:38.1(a) (1989), La. Supreme Court Rules, Part G, General Administrative
Rules, § 4.
269. Id. at Rule 24:38.1(d).
270. Id. According to the rule the supreme court performs this function "under its
inherent and administrative authority, Louisiana Constitution Article V, Sections 1, 5."
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in fiscal year 1987.271 Before approaching the legislature for such a large
addition to the judicial budget, it is logical to assume that the Judicial
Budgetary Control Board would want a clear and unequivocal statement
by the supreme court in a case establishing the legislature's constitutional
obligation to supply this additional money to the district court.
At this juncture, the legislature has opted to do otherwise and impose
the responsibility for operation of the district courts upon the parishes.
Given the many demands upon the state fisc to support colleges, schools,
prisons, and the myriad state health and welfare agencies, the legislature
is unlikely to voluntarily assume a substantial fiscal burden that it has
passed on to the parishes for so long. Thus the Judicial Budgetary
Control Board does not presently possess the answer to the financial
woes of the district courts absent a clear judicial statement of a con-
stitutional obligation of state government to finance district court op-
erations.
b. Parish Government Financing
As we have seen, present law imposes upon parish governments the
obligation to support district court operations without providing the
fiscal means to meet that responsibility. Indeed, it is primarily the paucity
of financial resources rather than mismanagement that has driven parish
governments across the state to surcease their statutorily mandated ob-
ligations. Yet, the district court in the Tangipahoa judges' case denied
the mandamus sought by the district judges in part because the parish
government was statutorily obligated to provide facilities to the district
court.
27 2
Curiously, the district court then observed:
Plaintiffs argue that Tangipahoa Parish does not have the funds
to contribute to the support of the 21st Judicial District Court.
This was perhaps in a measure correct. The Parish could not
afford to pay the electric bills to keep the court house open,
however, the Parish did enter into an agreement with the utility
271. The writer's inquiry revealed that no official source in the legislature, the executive
branch, or in the judiciary possesses the statistics necessary to delineate the total cost of
district court operation in Louisiana. The only extant compilation of that date is Un-
published Data compiled by Marvin Lyons, Legislative Cordinator, Police Jury Association
of Louisiana in response to a questionnaire in April of 1987 sent to all 64 parishes.
Lyons' data is the source for the composite figure of twenty to thirty million dollars.
Only 50 of 64 parishes responded to his survey. The three largest parishes-Orleans, East
Baton Rouge, and Jefferson-did not report criminal district court expenditures as a
separate item.
272. Twenty-First Judicial District Court v. State, No. 890-1369, La. 21st J.D.C. (Sept.
8, 1989) (suit roll 387, frame 1453).
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company and the Clerk of Court, and electricity was restored
to the Courthouse.
The Court is of the opinion, after having heard the evidence,
that the Plaintiffs have failed to show a justiciable controversy,
one that could not be solved by exploring all the avenues avail-
able to them. The problem of financing the operation of the
court could be solved by the governing authority of the parish
with its proposed tax to be voted on by the people of the parish
in October, 1989; it could be solved by properly addressing its
budgetary needs to the Judicial Budgetary Control Board, and
it could address its needs to the Criminal Court Fund.7 3
QUERY: Can the fate of the fundamental judicial unit upon which
the entire state judicial system depends to conduct trials of serious civil
and criminal cases rest upon such a thin reed of happenstance? Is the
judiciary a co-equal branch of state government if it must depend for
its very survival upon the vagaries of a police jury's negotiation of an
overdue light bill? What undue pressures are brought to bear willy-nilly
upon the district court when the police jury or the friendly utility
company are next before it as litigants? Is it consonant with the status
of the judiciary as a co-equal branch of government to allow closure
of a state district court upon defeat of a local tax measure? 74
The Tangipahoa district judges pointed out to the district courts
that they were using the judicial expense fund to pay for enhanced local
court facilities, which the parish could not otherwise afford, rather than
for the day to day operations of the district courts such as: repairs and
renovations to the court rooms, adding jury boxes, and other enhance-
ments decided upon by the judges en banc. In its decision, the district
court pointed out that under Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:996 and
996.7, the judges could use the judicial expense fund for capital outlay
"only for the necessary expenses for the operation of the court." Of
course, then the parish would have to fund the necessary courtroom
capital improvements out of the same general fund that is inadequate
to pay operational expenses of the courts, thereby completing a vicious
circle.
273. Id.
274. Parenthetically, the people of Tangipahoa Parish passed the one percent sales tax
proposed by their parish council in October, 1989. Promulgation and Proces Verbal of
October 7, 1989, tax election, Tangipahoa Parish Council Minutes, October 23, 1989,
1989 Minute Book, 325-30. Seventy-five percent of the proceeds were dedicated to roads
and bridges, while twenty-five percent will go into the general fund to be fought over
by the courts, the district attorney, and other general fund claimants. Mandated parish
government financing is obviously not the final answer to district court financing problems.
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c. Judicial Expense Fund or Criminal Court Fund Financing
Reliance upon the judicial expense fund as the sole source of fi-
nancing district court facilities and staff is ill-founded for numerous
reasons previously noted.275 At present, both the judicial expense fund
and the criminal court fund are fluctuating funds that depend upon
such variables as the volume of litigation, the number of crimes com-
mitted in the jurisdiction, "the size and location of the parish," 2 6 and
whether the parish is rural or urban.
Faced with the police jury's contention that the district attorney's
office should be financed primarily from the criminal court fund and
his other special funds, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Reed v. Wash-
ington Parish Police Jury,277 said:
These additional sources were never intended to wrest the pri-
mary responsibility for funding the 16:6 expenses from the shoul-
ders of the legislative branch of government. Characteristics such
as discretionary usage, instability of amounts available, alloca-
tions among several officers, the need for court approval, negate
the availability of these funds as a primary source to insure the
basic function of the district attorney will not be impaired.2
71
Applying the Reed rationale to the situation of the state district
court judiciary leads one inexorably to the conclusion that the provisions
for district court funding in the judicial expense fund and the criminal
court fund should not remove the "primary responsibility for fund-
ing... [judiciary] expenses from the shoulders of the legislative branch
of government." Only a stable source of funding via annual state budget
appropriations avoids the constitutional and ethical pitfalls inherent in
patchwork financing of the judiciary though special statutory funds and
parish general funds, none of which are truly equal to the task. En-
actment of annual state budget allocations for district court operations
may well render both the judicial expense fund and criminal court fund
provisions for the district courts superfluous. Certainly, a scheme of
state financing would be much simpler than the current hodgepodge of
district court financing provisions and would allow the district court
judiciary to make budget forecasts on a more rational basis.
D. Article V of the Louisiana Constitution Makes All Judges State
Officers Beyond the Scope of Parish Government Control
All judgeships created pursuant to Article V of the Louisiana Con-
stitution of 1974 are state officers beyond the plenary control of either
275. See infra, Part VII, B, at pp. 671-72.
276. Reed v. Washington Parish Police Jury, 518 So. 2d 1044, 1048 (La. 1988).
277. 518 So. 2d 1044 (La. 1988).
278. Id. at 1048-49.
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municipal or parish executive or legislative bodies. In Cosenza v. Aetna
Ins. Co.,279 the court of appeal held that a parish had no liability for
the tortious conduct of city court employees, even though the parish
paid part of the court's operating costs, because the city judge was a
state officer and neither the police jury "nor any other executive body
at that level" had the power "to interfere with or direct [the] activities
of [the] court." 20
Even justice of the peace courts have been recognized to be "con-
stitutional offices exercising the judicial power of the State of Louisiana"
and presiding justices recognized as judges whose salaries cannot be
reduced during their terms of office by parish governing bodies. 28'
A fortiori, district court judges are state officers whose courts are
the matrix from which the judicial power of the State of Louisiana
originates. District court transcripts provide the facts that appellate courts
review. Unless they are manifestly erroneous, district court decisions are
not reversed. Ergo, a district judge's opinion will usually decide the
merits of a case.
Mere theoretical standing as a state officer cannot suffice to shield
the district court judiciary from practical impingement upon its inde-
pendence inherent in reliance upon local governmental largess to provide
for the courts' functioning.
E. Current Status of the Twenty-First Judicial District Judge's Case
The district judges of the twenty-first judicial district appealed the
district court decision rejecting their claim for state financing of their
operation. 28 2 On May 30, 1990, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of
Appeal rendered its decision affirming the district court.2 83
The court of appeal held, first, that local government funding of
the judicial branch of government was not an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority because the Louisiana Constitution did not spe-
cifically deny to the legislature the authority to delegate the duty of
funding the district and city courts to local government. The basic
rationale of the court of appeal's decision is contained in its citation
of the following language from the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision
in Board of Directors of Louisiana Recovery District v. All Taxpayers:284
279. 341 So. 2d 1304 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
280. Id. at 1305.
281. Quarles v. Jackson Parish Police Jury, 482 So. 2d 833, 836 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
writ denied, 486 So. 2d 750 (1986).
282. Twenty-First Judicial District Court v. State, No. CA 89-1937 (La. App. 1st Cir.
May 30, 1990).
283. Id.
284. Id. at 5-6, citing Board of Directors of Louisiana Recovery District v. All
Taxpayers, 529 So. 2d 384, 387-88 (La. 1988).
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[U]nlike the federal constitution, a state constitution's provisions
are not grants of power but instead are limitations on the
otherwise plenary power of the people of a state exercised through
its Legislature. In its exercise of the entire legislative power of
the state, the Legislature may enact any legislation that the state
constitution does not prohibit. Thus, to hold legislation invalid
under the constitution, it is necessary to rely on some particular
constitutional provision that limits the power of the legislature
to enact such a statute....
The reasoning embodied in the Recovery District rationale is flawed
both as a matter of state constitutional interpretation and as a matter
of political theory.
1. The Residuum of Sovereignty Is Not in the Legislature but in
the People under the Louisiana Constitution
The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution says: "the
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people."
Article I, Section 1 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 provides:
"All government, of right, originates with the people, is founded on
their will alone, and is instituted to protect the rights of the individual
and for the good of the whole." Exercising their authority as repre-
sentatives of the sovereign power of the people the delegates to the
Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973 wrote a basic document
which is a higher law not amenable to amendment by ordinary legislative
act.
Yet insofar as the legislative acts delegating responsibility to local
government impinge upon the ability of the judicial branch to function
as a separate co-equal branch of government, these acts abrogate the
tri-partite system of government created by Article II of the Louisiana
Constitution.
2. American Political Theory Does Not Recognize Any
Legislature Vested with Total Sovereignty
The court of appeal, as did the district court, failed to deal with
this fundamental argument of the twenty-first judicial district judges.
Instead the court of appeal appears to have vested the legislature with
the full unbridled power of sovereignty-akin to Jean Jacque Rousseau's
285. 529 So. 2d 384, 387 (La. 1988).
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General Will. 28 6 Indeed, the first circuit's formulation and exposition of
legislative power is even more reminiscent of Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan
which posited the formation of government via a social contract in which
the individual citizen surrendered all sovereignty over himself to the
sovereign state created by the social contract.
American constitutional theory is based upon neither Rousseau nor
Hobbes but on John Locke's theory of the social contract set out in
Two Treaties of Government. Under Locke's view of the social contract,
in making a constitution the people "transfer the exercise of their
supreme authority, legislative, executive, and judicial, to organs of gov-
ernment. "287 However, unlike Hobbes, Locke believed that the grant of
governmental power to the legislature was not unconditional. Although
Locke "called the power of the legislature fiduciary and a delegation
from the majority that acts for the community, he retained the older
view that the grant of the community divests the people of power so
long as the government is faithful to its duties.''288
Ergo, the twenty-first judicial district judges argued that the people
transferred to the judiciary certain governmental powers which are in-
defeasible by the legislature. If the legislature frustrates that grant of
judicial power by asking local government to assume an unbearable
burden of financing district court operation, then the judges have not
only the power but the obligation to legally enforce the judiciary's right
to adequate financing inherent in its establishment as a co-equal branch
of government under the Louisiana Constitution.
Suppose the legislature imposed upon the East Baton Rouge Parish
government the burden of providing financial support for the governor's
office staff? Would anyone hesitate to conclude that this would be an
unconstitutional delegation of the legislature's duty to provide adequate
financing for the executive branch of state government?
The court of appeal simply did not deal with the essential theoretical
issue presented by the Twenty-First Judicial District Judges case.
286. See G. Sabine, A History of Political Theory 585 (3d ed. 1964), wherein Professor
Sabine quotes Rousseau's article on Political Economy in the fifth volume of the En-
cyclopedia as follows: "The body politic, therefore, is also a moral being possessed of
a will; and this general will, which tends always to the preservation and welfare of the
whole and of every part, and is the course of the laws, constitutes for all the members
of the state, in their relations to one another and to it, the rule of what is just or
unjust." But even Rousseau did not believe that the sovereign people could permanently
divest themselves of their ultimate right of self-government by vesting sovereignty in a
legislative body. W. Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers 415 (2d ed. 1958).
287. Ebenstein, supra note 286, at 415.
288. Sabine, supra note 286, at 534.
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3. The Judiciary Has Inherent Power to Prevent the Frustration
of Its Constitutional Mission by the Legislature
Article V, Section 1 of the Louisiana Constitution says "the judicial
power is vested in a supreme court, courts of appeal, district courts
and other courts authorized by this Article." In its Twenty-First Judicial
District Court opinion the court of appeal recognizes that the legislature
is thereby prevented from divesting the three named courts of the judicial
power. 289 However, the court of appeal fails to come to grips with the
practical situation presented by the Tangipahoa Parish fiscal crisis. Thus,
if the parishes on whom the legislature has imposed the obligation of
financing district court operation cannot pay the bills, then the legislature
will have effectively done indirectly what it admittedly could not do
directly, i.e. deny the district courts the resources necessary to carry out
their constitutional mission.
Recognizing the existence of an inherent judicial power to do all
things reasonably necessary for the exercise of their function as courts,29°
the court of appeal nonetheless refuses to extend the scope of that
inherent power to compelling the legislature to provide adequate funding
for court operation in the state budget. In taking that restrictive view
of inherent powers, the court of appeal relies primarily on a historical
argument. Since the delegates to the Louisiana Constitutional Convention
rejected a proposal which would have mandated that the total cost of
state judicial system be paid from the state general fund, the court of
appeal deduces an intent of the framers of the constitution not to change
the system of parish funding of district court operation.
Two comments are in order on the point:
(1) At the time of the constitutional convention in 1973 the oil
economy in Louisiana was prosperous and the district court
financing by local governments had not yet emerged as a prob-
lem; and
(2) The delegates in 1973 were never squarely presented with
the critical issue made out by the Tangipahoa Parish situation:
What is the obligation of the legislature to fund the district
courts when local governments are manifestly unable to meet
that obligation?
Had the delegates been presented with empirical evidence that the
prevailing system of local government court financing was inadequate,
as such evidence now plainly exists, it is plausible to propose that they
would have enunciated clearly the obligation of the legislature to provide
289. Twenty-First Judicial District Court v. State, No. CA 89-1937 (La. App. 1st Cir.
May 30, 1990), at 9.
290. Id. at 10.
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the funds for court operation implicit in the very system of separation
and balance of powers. At any rate, the records of the constitutional
convention are bereft of any discussion of the constitutional impasse
which would be created if local governments did not possess the means
to finance district court operation.
At this juncture, counsel for the twenty-first judicial district court
judges has advised the writer that the judges will seek writs from the
Louisiana Supreme Court to attempt to reverse the decision of the court
of appeal.
IX. TRIAL COURTS FINANCED BY THE STATE ARE A SNE QUA NON
OF A SEPARATE INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT
The Louisiana Supreme Court provided a compelling theoretical basis
for the position that the state government should finance district courts
adequately in Konrad v. Jefferson Parish CounciP91 when it said:
La. Const. Art. II, §§ 1 and 2 divide governmental power into
three separate branches and provide that no one branch shall
exercise powers belonging to the others. These sections establish
the basis for the recognition of inherent powers in the judicial
branch which the legislative and the executive branches cannot
abridge.
Under the doctrine of inherent powers, courts have the power
(other than those powers expressly enumerated in the constitution
and the statutes) to do all things reasonably necessary for the
exercise of their functions as courts. The doctrine is a corollary
of the concepts of separation of powers and of judicial inde-
pendence, in that other branches of government cannot, by
denying resources or authority to the court, prevent the courts
from carrying out their constitutional responsibilities as an in-
dependent branch of government.
The doctrine of inherent powers has been utilized ... to
require the appropriation or expenditure of funds reasonably
necessary for the court's functioning as a court. 92 The doctrine
exists because it is essential to the survival of the judiciary as
an independent branch of government.
In the context of the current fiscal crises of Louisiana parish gov-
ernments and the easily demonstrable inability of those governments to
provide adequate financing of district courts, the separation of powers
logic expressed in Konrad leads inexorably to the conclusion that the
291. 520 So. 2d 393, 397 (La. 1988).
292. Citing Lancaster County v. Brinthall, 29 Pa. 38 (1857); Note, Judicial Financial
Autonomy and Inherent Power, 57 Cornell L. Rev. 975 (1972).
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state is constitutionally required to appropriate funds for statewide op-
eration of district courts.
Pennsylvania recently faced similar problems. In County of Alle-
gheny v. Pennsylvania,23 the county brought a declaratory judgment
proceeding against the state alleging that a constitutional mandate for
a unified judicial system required the state to provide funds necessary
for the functioning of all parts of the Commonwealth's unified judicial
system and, specifically, for the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County. The county alleged, inter alia, that "there are continuing dis-
putes between the county and the Court of Common Pleas concerning
the funding of [the Court's] employees ' 29 4 as required by the Pennsyl-
vania statutes.
QUERY: in Reed v. Washington Parish, the Louisiana Supreme
Court posited the right of parish governments to inquire into the rea-
sonableness in kind and amount of budget requests by parish consti-
tutional officers such as the district attorney. Would the power to inquire
as to the reasonableness of judicial budget requests for salaries of court
personnel not logically follow? Such inquiry into the reasonableness of
judicial budget requests by parish governments would without doubt
lead to the same sort of internecine disputes decried by the Allegheny
County government.
Because it was the Allegheny County government that brought suit,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could not rely on the doctrine of
inherent powers as it would probably have done had the Allegheny trial
court judges been the plaintiffs. Nonetheless, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reached the same result sought by the district judges in the
Tangipahoa Parish case by referring to the "legal and constitutional
implications" of the "unified judicial system" required by the Penn-
sylvania Constitution. First, the Pennsylvania court found that:
[W]hen relations between the judicial branch and the county
governments deteriorate to the point where litigation is required
to settle disagreements as to funding, the relationship is neither
harmonious nor unified but rather, fragmented.2 95
Similar fragmentation is apparent in the litigation that has already
occurred between the St. Landry Parish, Grant Parish, and Tangipahoa
Parish governments and the district courts residing in those jurisdictions.
Second, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that employment
of staff was suspect in the county financed court system because
[tihe purpose of a unified judicial system is to provide even-
293. 534 A.2d 760 (Pa. 1987).
294. Id. at 761.
295. Id. at 764.
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handed, unbiased and competent administration of justice. The
expectation is that cases will be processed as well in one county
as another. In order to meet this expectation, however, judicial
resources and staffing must be proportionately similar in all
judicial districts. There must be uniform hiring practices and
standards and judges must be free to hire competent staff, not
merely those referred by local political figures. 296
In this sense, the "unified court system" guaranteed by the Pennsylvania
Constitution is designed to provide a trial court system virtually syn-
onymous with that implicit in the Louisiana Constitution's guarantees
to all persons "equal protection of the laws ' 297 and access to the
courts.
298
Finally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court believed the public's per-
ception of the judicial system was adversely affected by county financing
of trial courts because
[t]he citizens of this Commonwealth have a right not only to
expect neutrality and fairness in the adjudication of legal cases,
but also ... a right to be absolutely certain this neutrality and
fairness will actually be applied in every case. But if court
funding is permitted to continue in the hands of local political
authorities it is likely to produce nothing but suspicion or per-
ception of bias and favoritism. As the framers of our constitution
recognized, a unified system of jurisprudence cannot tolerate
such uncertainties. All courts must be free and independent from
the occasion of political influence and no court should even be
perceived to be biased in favor of local political authorities who
pay the bills.299
Much the same reasoning persuaded Louisiana to abandon a system
in which parish governments paid a substantial increment of district
judges' salaries in favor of a system in which all district judges across
the state are paid the same salary by the state qua state. Moreover, the
aspiration of guaranteeing a uniform, neutral, fair, and unbiased judicial
system espoused by the Pennsylvania Constitution is precisely the same
goal embraced by the Louisiana Constitution in article I, section 22,
which guarantees that:
All courts shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate
remedy by due process of law and justice, administered without
denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in
his person, property, reputation or other rights.
296. Id. at 764-65.
297. La. Const. art. I, § 3.
298. La. Const. art. I, § 22.
299. County of Allegheny v. Pennsylvania, 534 A.2d 760, 765 (Pa. 1987).
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Procedurally, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court suggested a practical
way to move from a system of county funding to state funding of
courts by staying its judgment to afford the Pennsylvania Legislature
"an opportunity to enact appropriate funding legislation" consistent
with its decision. 3°° Pending adoption of the new legislation, the prior
system of county funding was maintained in place.
It is submitted that the Louisiana appellate courts in the Tangipahoa
Parish case should reach the same result as the Pennsylvania courts. To
do so would implement both the letter and the spirit of the Louisiana
Constitution, as well as the well-established doctrine of inherent power
to require the appropriation and expenditure of funds reasonably nec-
essary for the functioning of the courts qua courts. In the meantime,
district courts must rely on statutory mandates and the doctrine of
inherent judicial power to compel parishes to fund their operations.
X. THE DISTRICT AND CITY COURTS HAVE INHERENT POWER TO
COMPEL PARISH GOVERNMENTS TO APPROPRIATE EXPENSES REASONABLY
NECESSARY FOR TiHEIR OPERATION
Two cases decided simultaneously by the Louisiana Third Circuit
Court of Appeal have held that district courts and city courts can compel
local governing authorities to pay expenses reasonably necessary for their
operation.
A. McCain v. Grant Parish Police Jury
In McCain v. Grant Parish Police Jury,0' the district court judge
sought a mandamus to compel the police jury to pay past due district
court bills and to reform its budget to provide for expected future bills.
On appeal, the third circuit affirmed the trial court's decision granting
the mandamus because denying operating funds to the court would
infringe upon the judiciary's status as a coequal branch of our tripartite
system of state government. The court said:
Our government is based on a constitution. One of the most
basic and fundamental features of our system is the vesting of
power in three "coordinate, independent, coequal and potentially
coextensive" branches.
1. Faulty Separation of Powers Analysis
The court then observed that under article VI, section 7 of the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974, the Grant Parish police jury is "the
300. Id.
301. 440 So. 2d 1369 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983).
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local legislative branch of government" to which "the legislature has
given . .. broad powers, including the power to levy and collect taxes,
pass ordinances, incur debts and spend public monies for public pur-
poses. '30 2 Next the court recognized that the Local Government Article
of the constitution denied local governments the power to establish or
run the courts.3 03
Until this point the McCain opinion was theoretically sound in
recognizing that: (a) the police jury, as a creature of state government,
enjoyed only those powers that the state legislature has given it, and
(b) the constitution prohibits the state legislature from giving local
governments power to "create" or "affect" the judiciary.3°4 At this
juncture, however, the court faltered in its analysis.
Having correctly characterized the thirty-fifth judicial district court
as an organ of the judiciary, which is a coequal branch among the
three branches of state government, the court then incorrectly charac-
terized the police jury as standing "on an independent and equal footing"
with the district court.3 5 Of course, the district court did enjoy co-equal
status with the state legislature but not with the police jury, which
combined the legislative and executive function in parish government. 3°0
Having struck off down the wrong analytical road, the McCain
court continued to travel that way in framing the issue presented by
the case as:
[wihether a court, as an equal member of our governmental
triumvirate, has the inherent power to compel a legislative body,
another of the co-equal branches of government, to budget the
reasonably necessary expenses incurred to provide the basic needs
of an efficient, effective court. We hold that courts in the state
of Louisiana do possess such inherent power.30 7
The McCain court did, however, correctly state that "the primary
responsibility for supplying the funds to pay for the operation" of the
court had been placed upon the police jury. 0 8 In a footnote, the court
referred to various statutes that oblige the parish to pay for juvenile
court expenses,3°9 the district judge's office expenses, 10 and to provide
302. Id. at 1371.
303. La. Const. art. VI, § 25 says "courts and their officers may be established or
affected only as provided in Article V of this constitution." Article V is the Judiciary
Article.
304. 440 So. 2d at 1371.
305. Id.
306. Note, McCain v. Grant Parish Police Jury: Judicial Use of the Inherent Powers,
Doctrine to Compel Adequate Judicial Funding, 46 La. L. Rev. 157 (1985).
307. 440 So. 2d at 1372.
308. Id. at 1371-72.
309. La. R.S. 13:1586 (1983).
310. La. R.S. 15:571.11 (1981 and Supp. 1990).
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a suitable building and requisite furniture for the district court.3 ' The
third circuit's decision in McCain, which indicates that providing the
courthouse is a mandatory obligation of the parish governing authority,
is at odds with its decision in the St. Landry Parish case, which indicates
that providing the courthouse is not a mandated expense.
2. Mainstream Inherent Powers Analysis
Relying on conventional wisdom as expressed in cases arising "in
many of our sister states," the McCain court then posited the existence
of an "inherent authority of the courts to compel payment of those
expenses necessarily incurred by the courts in the discharge of their
duties. 31 2 Acknowledging that the issue was res nova in Louisiana, the
court of appeal justified its declaration of the inherent power of the
courts on the grounds that:
[s]uch power is essential to preserve the independence of courts
which are often called upon to rule on the acts of these same
public officials, who control public funds, and the courts must
be free to act without fear of retaliation .... 313
The' inherent powers analysis in McCain may be applied verbatim
to justify the claim of the district judges in the Tangipahoa Parish case
against the state legislature, as well as against the Tangipahoa Parish
council.
3. Limitations on the Court's Inherent Powers
The McCain decision says that although the power of a court to
incur, and compel the payment of, debts for services and supplies
"reasonably necessary for its efficient and effective operation is inherent,
such power is not unlimited. ' 31 4 Just as the Louisiana Supreme Court
would later, in Reed v. Washington Parish, circumscribe the district
attorney's right to receive statutorily mandated expenses by requiring
that the expenses be reasonable in kind and amount, so the third circuit
in McCain circumscribed a judge's right to receive expenses mandated
by statute and by the court's own inherent power. Thus, a judge's
inherent power was said to extend only to expenses that "were both
reasonable and necessary to the operation of his court. ' '315
311. La. R.S. 33:4713 (1988).
312. 440 So. 2d at 1372.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1373.
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4. Mandamus Proper
Anticipating the supreme court's stance in Reed v. Washington
Parish, the court of appeal held that mandamus was the proper pro-
cedural vehicle for the district judge to employ in compelling the police
jury to pay his mandated expenses.
5. Deficit Would Create Constitutional Conflict
Judge Domengeaux, in a terse but perhaps prescient concurrence to
the McCain majority opinion, made it clear that the third circuit was
not expressing an opinion "as to any exigency which might place a
police jury into a deficit situation by paying such district court ex-
penses. 316 No other statement in the jurisprudence to date recognizes
the obvious truth stated by Judge Domengeaux when he said "such a
contingency would entail possible conflicting constitutional provisions. 317
Because the legislature is constitutionally required to adopt a bal-
anced budget,"' because the state has statutorily prohibited the parish
governments from deficit spending,31 9 and because parish governments
may not constitutionally exercise their spending powers contrary to gen-
eral law, a20 it follows that proposed deficit spending for judicial expenses
would create a patent conflict between constitutional powers granted the
judiciary and constitutional limits imposed on the exercise of parish
legislative powers.
6. Burden of Proof
The McCain approach suggests that the burden of proving that
judicial expenses are reasonable and necessary rests on the judges pro-
posing them.3 2' This conclusion is supported by the supreme court's
decision in Reed v. Washington Parish that the district attorney bore
the burden of proving that his expenses were reasonable.
7. Critique of Inherent Powers Doctrine
The inherent powers doctrine presents numerous snares for the un-
wary. The police jury has no expertise in what constitutes "reasonable"
judicial expense. Mere filing of a suit by a district judge may effectively
316. Id. at 1369, 1373 (Domengeaux, J., concurring).
317. Id.
318. La. Const. art. VII, § 10(B).
319. La. R.S. 33:2921 (1988) and other statutes cited hereinabove.
320. La. Const. art. VI, §§ 7(A), 30.
321. Note, supra note 306, at 157 and 163, agrees.
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preclude unbiased inquiry into the question. To require one district judge
to consider whether another district judge's expenses are unreasonable
is a tremendous request because the deciding judge may soon be forced
to lodge his own claim for unfunded expenses. The specter of bias
looms. Realistically, where will the police jury find a judge to testify
on its behalf?
Moreover, an inquiry into reasonableness of judicial spending should
not focus only on the nature of the specific items of expense being
sought from the general fund, as the McCain court seems to suggest is
proper, but should also extend to an examination as to whether the
judge in question has spent wisely his available funds from other sources
such as the judicial expense fund or the criminal court fund.122
Another problem with the inherent powers vehicle for enforcing
payment of judicial operating expenses lies in the real possibility that
constitutionally designated executive officers may seek to enforce funding
of their offices via the same device. What then would happen to the
traditional legislative role in sorting out competing budget claims via
the political process? Does this not bring us ever closer to rule by
judicial fiat, under the guise of enforcing the constitution, in this area
as we have done in so many other problem areas of American govern-
ment.3
23
An earlier case involving a request for mandamus based on the
inherent powers doctrine was brought by the judge of the city court of
Bossier City to compel the Bossier Parish Police Jury to pay its pro
rata share of the amount necessary to increase the salaries of the clerks
and deputy clerks of the court. In Lyons v. Bossier Parish Police Jury,3 24
the second circuit court of appeal refused to apply the doctrine of
inherent powers. Instead the second circuit held that the police jury's
breach of its statutory duty under Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:1888
to pay the clerks a specified minimum salary constituted "a breach of
a ministerial duty for which mandamus will lie to compel performance
of that duty. 3 2
B. City Court of Breaux Bridge v. Town of Breaux Bridge
Having embarked on the broad trail of inherent powers in McCain,
the third circuit continued down that road in City Court of Breaux
Bridge v. Town of Breaux Bridge,326 which was decided contrary to the
second circuit's restrained statutory approach in Lyons and on the same
322. Note, supra note 306, at 159-61.
323. Such as jail standards, reapportionment, judicial election plans, for example.
324. 262 So. 2d 838 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
325. 262 So. 2d at 840.
326. 440 So. 2d 1374 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983), writ denied, 444 So. 2d 1219 (1984).
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day as McCain by another panel of the third circuit court. The third
circuit employed the inherent powers doctrine and granted a writ of
mandamus to the city judge of the Breaux Bridge City Court against
the city requiring the city to pay the reasonable and necessary expenses
of the court, including postage, printing of forms, telephone expenses,
and library upkeep. Query: suppose the city judge is an inveterate
telephone user and cherishes a library containing the Federal Reporters-
does a financially strapped city have to pay?
The trial court had found that the city owed the court only physical
facilities, "utilities, cleaning, painting, repairs and upkeep," and that
the types of expenses sought by the city judge should have been purchased
out of the proceeds of the city court traffic fund created by Louisiana
Revised Statutes 13:2488.78.327 However, the court of appeal disagreed,
specifically relying on McCain to say:
We do not regard the statutes referred to above as constituting
a limitation or negation of the inherent power possessed by the
city court of Breaux Bridge. The provisions of those statutes
simply lay down certain specific directions to the town and
authorize the assessment of court costs and the use of funds
derived from such assessment.3 2
In disregarding the city's argument that alternate statutory revenue
sources should have paid the Breaux Bridge City Court's expenses rather
than the city's general fund, the third circuit foreshadowed the supreme
court's dismissal of the parish's argument that the district attorney's
alternate statutory revenue sources should pay his expenses rather than
the parish's general fund in the Reed case.
To reach its decision in the Breaux Bridge case, the third circuit
had to dispose of an additional defense raised by the city. Breaux Bridge
contended that city courts were not expressly established by the con-
stitution, and thus did not share in the inherent powers enjoyed by
constitutional courts such as the district courts. In reply, the court of
appeal observed first that article V, section 15 of the Louisiana Con-
stitution of 1974 retained all existing city courts. More importantly, the
Breaux Bridge opinion holds that once city courts or other legislatively
created courts are established, they become "a coequal branch of local
government within the [statel judicial department" that partakes of
inherent judicial powers. 29
The Breaux Bridge decision is of more than passing significance to
parish governing bodies because most city courts in Louisiana are also
327. Id. at 1375.
328. Id. at 1376.
329. Id. at 1376 (citing North Las Vegas v. Daines, 92 Nev. 292, 550 P.2d 399 (1976));
Azbarea v. North Las Vegas, 95 Nev. 109, 590 P.2d 161 (1979).
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ward courts with territorial jurisdiction extending across municipal
boundaries into rural parish areas. Consequently, most city courts in
Louisiana are funded in substantial part by parish governing bodies.
Thus parish governing bodies now face the specter of mandamus
suits by city courts as well as district courts relying upon the doctrine
of "inherent powers" to compel parish governments to pay their ex-
penses. There is no doubt that the doctrine of inherent judicial power
to enforce payment of the reasonable and necessary expenses of the
courts is now solidly ensconced in our law.
C. Inherent Judicial Powers Expanded
Expansion of the inherent powers doctrine appears inevitable. Since
McCain was decided, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the
Family Court of East Baton Rouge Parish had the inherent power to
appoint counsel to represent an indigent parent in a child abandonment
procedure and to "award the attorney a reasonable fee to be paid from
a source which the court deems appropriate."1330 In that case, the De-
partment of Health and Human Resources was found to be the "ap-
propriate" party to pay the fee despite the absence of statutory authority.
Presumably, in other cases parish government might be held liable for
such indigent expenses as well even though the basis for requiring
payment is only "inherent judicial authority" and not statute.
The supreme court offered only these guidelines for exercise of its
inherent power to require payment of attorneys for indigents:
In deciding whether the state or one of its subdivisions, de-
partments, or agencies should pay the fee, a court must act
with comity toward the other branches of government and with
sensitive regard for the concepts of functional differentiation
and the checks and balances implied by the separation of powers
doctrine. Important considerations for a court taking such action
include the following: the structure and scheme of existing leg-
islation which may be applied by analogy, the ability of an
entity to budget and finance such expenditures, the entity's
responsibility for incurring the need for legal services or for
administering the program out of which the need arises, and
the existence of any custom or informal practice regarding the
payment of such fees."'
330. State ex rel. Johnson, 475 So. 2d 340, 342 (La. 1985).
331. Id. at 342. Judge Blanche's dissent in the Johnson holding suggests that the
judiciary usurps the legislature's authority to provide a "uniform system for securing and
compensating qualified counsel for indigents" under La. Const. art. 1, § 13.
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In State v. Lembcke,33 2 the first circuit court of appeal held that a
trial judge's automatic ten day sentences violated the mandate of Louis-
iana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 to individualize sentences.
In a comment pregnant with meaning for parish governing bodies the
court said:
In an apparent defense of his actions, the trial judge stated
that he did not have the staff to supervise any alternative to a
jail sentence. Any shortcomings in the staffing of a court to
the extent that a court is not staffed at a reasonable necessary
level to perform its constitutional duty can be cured by the
court.333
Thus, Lembcke provides a jurisprudential rationale for the district
court's creation of staff positions (to be financed presumably by the
parish governing body) through its "inherent powers" absent statutory
authorization. One wonders how much farther this inherent judicial
power might go.
Indeed, it is hard to envision an effective shield that beleaguered
parish governing bodies might raise effectively to defend their general
fund treasuries against the sword of inherent judicial powers. When
Justice Lemmon concurred in the denial of writs in the Breaux Bridge
City Court case, he said: "The Town's recourse, if it does not want
to fund the reasonable expenses of the City Court's operation, is to
request that the legislature abolish the Court. 33 4 Not likely, is it?
D. Judicial Pensions
Retirement benefits for judges who were in office on or before
October 1, 1976, are the joint responsibility of "[t]he Louisiana State
Employees' Retirement System and the State of Louisiana and any
political 'subdivision or agency thereof that pays, contributes to or sup-
plements the salary." 3" Many parish governments are presently paying
portions of salaries of sitting city judges while paying portions of the
retirement benefits of retired city judges and even district judges who
were in office before October 1, 1976. This is a mandate to pay sub-
stantial costs that will extend until all judges serving before October 1,
1976, have departed the earth.
332. 444 So. 2d 353 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
333. Id. at 354 (citing McCain v. Grant Parish Police Jury, 440 So. 2d 1369 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1983)).
334. 444 So. 2d 1219 (La. 1984) (Lemmon, J., concurring).
335. La. R.S. 13:25(B) (1983).
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E. Compelling Payment of Judicial Expenses Via Citation for
Contempt
If district courts possess inherent power to compel parish govern-
ments to pay their reasonable expenses, could a recalcitrant parish gov-
erning body that refuses to pay such expenses be cited by the court for
contempt? Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 225(10) defines
constructive contempt to include "any ... act or omission ... intended
to obstruct or interfere with the orderly administration of justice."
Failure of the parish governing authority to pay the judicial light bill
may well be construed to fit that definition of contempt.
XI. AR ExPENDIrruREs BY A PARISH OFFICIAL THAT EXCEED His
APPROVED BUDGET COLLECTIBLE IN A MANDAMUS ACTION OR ULTRA
VIRES
The Local Government Budget Act requires each parish official to
submit a balanced budget. 3 6 Logically, an official who exceeds his budget
should not be able to avail himself of the mandamus against the parish
governing body to recoup his excess expenditures. Spending in violation
of budget acts would appear to be an ultra vires act.
It is well established that political bodies are not estopped by the
unauthorized or illegal acts of their officers,33 7 or bound by a contract
made in violation of a public bid law. " Applying a similar rationale
to expenditures by a parish official in violation of the budget law would
result in a conclusion that he cannot recoup those expenditures via
mandamus.
Exactly this argument has been made in a pending district court
suit wherein the current St. Landry Parish Clerk of Court seeks a writ
of mandamus ordering the police jury to pay $90,000.00 in office ex-
penses already incurred in 1989. The amount sought is the amount by
which the Clerk's actual expenditures exceeded the $100,000.00 the police
jury had budgeted for her office in 1989. To the clerk's suit the police
jury has rejoined: (1) the clerk incurred the expenses before lodging an
amended budget request with the police jury as requested by the third
circuit in Post v. Madison Parish Police Jury and by the Local Gov-
ernment Budget Act, and (2) therefore, the clerk's expenditures were
ultra vires.3 9
336. La. R.S. 39:1304(A), (E) (1989).
337. Parish of Jefferson v. Ekco-Glaco, 280 So. 2d 629, 632 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973);
State ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. Register of State Land Office, 193 La. 883, 192 So. 519
(1939).
338. State v. L.W. Eaton Constr. Co., Inc., 392 So. 2d 477, 479 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1980).
339. Patti Hebert Kempf v. St. Landry Parish Police Jury, No. 89-C-5290-B, 27th
J.D.C. in Defendant's Exception of Prematurity.
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XII. THERE IS NO COHERENT STATUTORY SYSTEM PROVIDING FOR
IMPOSITION OF MANDATED COSTS ON PARISH GOVERNMENTS IN
LOUISIANA, NOR ARE ADEQUATE MEANS PROVIDED FOR PAYMENT OF
SUCH COSTS
The melange of statutes that impose mandated expenses on parish
governing bodies are difficult to categorize with any rationality. There
is no cohesive organization of the mandated expenses within the titles
of the statutes dealing with parish government; instead they are scattered
willy-nilly throughout the Louisiana Revised Statutes. The various man-
datory expense statutes are replete with commands to parish governing
authorities to pay expenses over which they enjoy no semblance of
normal legislative appropriation control. For example, the parish gov-
erning bodies must pay the salaries of court reporters that are set and
increased solely by the district judge without approval of the parish
governing body. If the same method were employed in the state legislative
appropriation process, the court of appeal judges would decide what
their salary will be next year and compel the legislature to appropriate
enough money to pay them.
The language of the statutory mandates is inconsistent and confusing
because the verbiage of the commands does not fit any recognizable
semantic formula. Worst of all, in many cases the statutes themselves
do not establish the amounts of the mandated expenses, but leave them
to the unfettered discretion of the local officials who can demand
payment from the parish governing body for expenses on a meager or
grandiose scale. Thus, expenses for the same office vary wildly from
parish to parish. In the case of judicial expenses, such as the salaries
of court reporters, they may vary wildly from judge to judge within
the same judicial district.314
Some of the statutes are clearly mandatory, saying that the parish
"shall" pay a given category of expenditures, while other statutes seem
merely directory because they say that the parish governing authority
"may" pay given expenses from its general fund. Some mandatory
expense statutes employ both the mandatory "shall" and the precatory
"may," leading ultimately to confusion over whether the expenses in-
volved are really mandated statutory charges against the parish general
fund.
Where disputes between the parish governing body and the official
receiving mandated expense allotments have resulted in litigation, the
courts have provided some interpretive guidance as to how apparent
conflicts in language of a particular statute are to be reconciled. But
340. E.g., in 1988, the 27th judicial district court reporters salaries in four divisions
varied from $25,000.00 per annum in one division to $35,000.00 per annum in another
division.
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nowhere in the jurisprudence has there yet been an overall reconciliation
of the ranking of the competing statutory expense claims against parish
fiscs.
XIII. CONCLUSION
The third circuit in McCain groped toward a verbalization of the
need for essential reform, but did not quite reach it. The separation of
powers doctrine requires the judiciary to receive adequate financing if
it is to function as a co-equal branch of state government. To be a co-
equal branch of state government, the judiciary must be funded entirely
by the state government. Both the constitution and common sense require
it. Based on 1988 budgets, full funding of the judiciary by the state
government would remove more than $20,000,000.00 in expenses from
the budgets of the beleaguered parish governments. The Tangipahoa
Parish judges case presents an opportunity that should not be missed
to remove the district courts from the mandated expenses fray by re-
quiring state funding of their operational costs.
The legislature must undertake a wholesale revision of the revised
statutes relating to parish government finance to unify all statutes im-
posing financial burdens upon parish governing bodies. In conjunction
with this plan, a constitutional amendment prohibiting the state legis-
lature from imposing financial obligations on local governments without
providing a source of funds to pay the mandated costs should be adopted.
Further, a coherent body of statutory charges must be coupled with a
cohesive plan for parish taxing and licensing power that will raise revenue
sufficient to meet those statutory charges. Salaries of district court
personnel must be standardized statewide in the same manner that district
judges salaries were standardized in 1976.
Only such forceful and dramatic reforms can rescue parish governing
bodies from the plight created by excessive mandated expenses and
inadequate revenues. Decay of the parish infrastructure of roads and
bridges in Louisiana is apparent to even the casual observer. Farm to
market roads are crumbling in a state that still relies on agriculture as
the base of its rural economy. As of December 31, 1988, there were
more than 58,000 miles of roads in Louisiana, of which seventy-two
percent were maintained by local government.34' Fifty-five percent of
those roads, or more than 32,000 miles, must be maintained by parish
governments. At its zenith, Rome flourished when its citizenry was
provided with a comprehensive network of highways including more than
341. Traffic and Planning Division, Louisiana Department of Transportation and De-
velopment, Computer Printout entitled "Road Mileage by Parish," dated December 31,
1988, shows 58,389 total miles of roads in Louisiana, including 9,794.36 miles of city
streets and 32,063 miles of parish roads.
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fifty-thousand miles of first class roads.142 Roman hegemony faded as
its crumbling roads reflected the disarray of its increasingly chaotic
government.
Louisiana cannot hope to achieve economic parity with other states-
much less preeminence-so long as parish governments are rendered
impotent to rebuild a decent system of parish roads and bridges. In the
end, revitalization of parish government cannot occur unless and until
the problem of mandated costs is solved. 43
342. M. Grant, History of Rome 264 (1978).
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